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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of weather anomalies on migration in sub-Saharan Africa. The-
oretically, we show how weather anomalies induce rural-urban migration that subsequently triggers
international migration. We distinguish two transmission channels, an amenity and an economic
geography channel. Empirically, based on annual, cross-country panel data for sub-Saharan Africa,
our results suggest that weather anomalies increased internal and international migration through
both channels. We estimate that temperature and rainfall anomalies caused a total displacement
of 5 million people in net terms during the period 1960-2000, i.e. a minimum of 130’000 people
every year. Further weather anomalies, based on IPCC projections on climate change, could lead
to an additional annual displacement of 11 million people by the end of the 21st century.
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It is now well-known that local weather anomalies are able to impose signiﬁcant strains on economies
(World Bank, 2010). A topic that has received much media coverage but less academic research is how
exactly these weather anomalies inﬂuence the incentives to migrate to places that are perceived to be
less affected by weather anomalies. The amount of people that had to leave their homes due to changes
in local weather conditions is believed to be everything else but negligible. Estimates range from an
annual displacement of 15 million environmental refugees1 during the 70s (El-Hinnawi, 1985) to 25
million for the sole year of 1995, of which 18 million originate from Africa (Myers, 1996). Increasing
risks are predicted for the future, with a sea level rise of one meter potentially producing between 50
million (Jacobson, 1988) to 200 million environmental migrants (Myers, 1996). As reviewed by Piguet
et al. (2011), these authors were seeking to raise awareness surrounding the potential impact of climate
change on international migration. However, these estimates2 lack a robust empirical framework and
are mostly extrapolations based on the amount of people living in affected regions. Thus, despite
the comprehensive overview of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) fourth report,
the lack of robust evidence regarding the relationship between migration and weather anomalies is
unfortunate (Boko et al., 2007).
The general knowledge of the effect of weather anomalies on migration is still somewhat limited,
especially for a topic which is so very much at the heart of the modern, international debate. Studies
that investigate the environmental motives for rural-urban migration are, for example, Findley (1994),
1The term ‘environmental refugee’ is itself under discussion. The distinction between refugee and migrant is an impor-
tant policy debate, notably in terms of assistance and protection, see Black (2001), McGregor (1993), Kibreab (1997) or
Suhrke (1994). In the rest of the paper, the term ‘environmental migrant’ will be used. In the data, the people crossing a
border as a result of environmental damage would not be considered as refugees given the mandate to the UNHCR by the
51 Convention of Geneva, but they would be counted as migrants in national statistics.
2In its 2010 World Development Report on Development and Climate Change, the World Bank (2010, pp.108-109)
underlines that these “estimates are based on broad assessments of people exposed to increasing risks rather than analyzes
of whether exposure will lead them to migrate.”
1Barrios et al. (2006), Henry et al. (2003), Mueller and Osgood (2009) or Saldaña-Zorrilla and Sand-
berg (2009). Articles that look at international environmental migration are Munshi (2003) and Feng
et al. (2010), focusing on Mexican-US migration, as well as Naude (2008), who studies whether nat-
ural disasters induces conﬂicts which lead to out-migration (for a theoretical work, see Marchiori and
Schumacher, 2011). While each of the articles provides an important contribution to our understanding
of how weather anomalies may drive migration, neither of the articles studies migration in within the
more holistic perspective that we try to advocate here.
As we shall argue, rural-urban and national-international migration are both intimately linked and
ought to be analyzed within a uniﬁed framework. It is, therefore, the objective of this article to provide
a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of weather anomalies on rural-urban-international
migration. Based upon the empirical analysis we also forward a tentative estimate of the number of en-
vironmental migrants in Africa between 1960 and 2000, as well as projections of future environmental-
driven migration based on UN population forecasts and IPCC future climate scenarios for the end of
the 21st century.
What are the stylized facts that a study of rural-urban and urban-international migration should
integrate? Firstly, it is well-known that weather anomalies bear the strongest direct impacts on agricul-
turalactivities, whereasthemanufacturing sectorishurtless(IPCC,2007). Thus, countrieswithalarge
dependency on the agricultural sector are particularly vulnerable to weather anomalies (Deschenes and
Greenstone, 2007; Fisher et al., 2011; World Bank, 2010). As the agricultural sector is predominantly
rural, while the manufacturing sector is mostly urban, we should expect migration from the rural to the
urban areas. Weather anomalies are, therefore, likely to foster urbanization (Barrios et al. 2006, Collier
et al. 2008). As this internal migration implies that more workers are now available in the urban sector,
this will exert a downward pressure on the urban wage at home, providing incentives for the urban
2workers to move across borders (Hatton and Williamson, 2003). Thus, international migration can be
seen as a consequence of the increasing pressures in the urban areas following rural-urban migration.
We dub the wage and urbanization effects the so-called ‘economic geographic channel’. In addition,
one should be able to account for the fact that weather anomalies could potentially affect international
migration, independently of the wage and urbanization channels. Such a direct impact is consistent
with studies emphasizing how weather variability may affect amenities (Rappaport, 2007) or pure non-
market costs such as the spread of diseases or a higher probability of death due to ﬂooding or excessive
heat waves (World Bank, 2010). Hence, we label this the ‘amenity channel’. In line with these stylized
facts, our framework encompasses the above channels. The theoretical model is a continuous time,
two-country model with a rural and urban sector, both pricing competitively. Weather anomalies affect
the productivity in the rural sector. We allow for rural-urban and urban-international migration, where
agents compare their wages in the different sectors and countries when deciding whether to migrate or
not. This model predicts that larger weather anomalies induce international migration through rural-
urban migration. Furthermore, the more depending a country is on the agricultural sector, the stronger
the impact of weather anomalies on migration.
We then collected a new cross-country panel dataset in order to study whether the theoretical results
hold in practice. Our focus here is on Africa for several particular reasons. Inhabitants of most sub-
Saharan countries already live on the brink of starvation, with often more than 60% of people living
below the poverty line (see UN Human Development Report 2007/2008). For example, in 2004 around
800 million people were at risk of hunger (FAO 2004) leading to around four million deaths annually.
Since many African countries are heavily relying on agricultural production (in several countries up
to 90% of the population work in the agricultural sector, see FAO 2004), even small changes in the
weather conditions can have signiﬁcant impacts on peoples’ chances of survival. Around half of those
3deaths are believed to have arisen in sub-Saharan Africa. Given several very likely scenarios of the
IPCC (2007) that predict increases in temperature and declines in rainfall for most of sub-Saharan
Africa, the number of deaths could easily double in the near future (Warren et al. 2006). In the light
of the recent events and IPCC projections one wonders which are the most important driving forces
behind the migration decisions in the sub-Saharan region. To our knowledge, Hatton and Williamson
(2003) are among the ﬁrst to have conducted an empirical analysis on the determinants of migration in
Africa. Their study underlines the importance of the wage gaps between sending and receiving regions
as well as demographic booms in the low-wage sending regions for explaining net migration within
sub-Saharan Africa. While taking into account economic and political determinants of migration, they
do not account for a potential environmental push factor that may be important in determining African
migration. The articles that look into part of this question are Barrios et al. (2006, 2010). In their 2006
article, the authors ﬁnd that weather conditions in sub-Saharan Africa lead to a displacement of people
internally. However, our theoretical model hints at further effects from weather anomalies, namely that
changes in urban centres and relative wages provide motivation for international migration, too. For
example, increased urbanization is likely to mitigate the impact of weather on international migration
due to agglomeration forces. One of our motivations, therefore, is to understand the importance of
these economic geography effects for migration in sub-Saharan Africa.
Though most previous studies proxy weather anomalies by rainfall (Barrios et al., 2006, 2010),
it is also well-known that a signiﬁcant part of weather anomalies in sub-Saharan Africa is related to
increases in temperature. Even small changes in temperature can very often be decisive for whether a
region is semi-arid like Italy or arid like Namibia. Dell et al. (2009) show that the detrimental impact
of weather anomalies on economic performances is mainly driven by annual variations in temperature.
Therefore, our aim here is to look speciﬁcally at both temperature and rainfall anomalies which provide
4a fairly complete picture of the true extent of weather anomalies (IPCC 2007).
Our results are as follows. Guided by the theoretical model, we study the economic geography
channel of weather anomalies on wages and urbanization, both of which the theoretical model predicts
to be the main variables that drive international migration decisions. We ﬁnd that weather anoma-
lies are, especially for agriculturally-dominated countries, an important determinant for international
migration over the period 1960-2000. Our interpretation of the empirical results in the light of the
theoretical model is as follows. We ﬁnd that larger weather anomalies leads to a lower wage. This
induces migration into the cities since cities are generally not directly (or as severely as rural areas) af-
fected by weather anomalies. Increases in urban centers lead to agglomeration externalities. However,
increased weather anomalies also (indirectly) induce lower urban wages. We ﬁnd that, overall, the
reduction in the wages outweighs the beneﬁts of urban concentrations (or agglomeration forces) and,
therefore, weather anomalies induce out-migration. Based on the empirical results we then estimate
that a minimum of around 5 million people have migrated internationally between 1960 and 2000 due
to variations in local weather in sub-Saharan Africa. This represents 0.3% of the population or 128’000
people every year. We then project the impact of weather anomalies on the future rates of migration
in sub-Saharan Africa based on the moderate IPCC climate scenario A1B (see Section 3.5 for details).
These estimates suggest that, in sub-Saharan Africa towards the end of the 21st century, every year an
additional 0.12%, 0.34% and 0.53% of the sub-Saharan African population will move in best, median
and worst weather forecasts of IPCC scenario A1B. Multiplied by the medium-fertility UN population
projection for the end of the century, this would amount, every year, to an additional displacement of
4, 11 and 25 million inhabitants in the best, median and worst weather forecast of the IPCC climate
scenario.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework. Section 3
5presents the data, methodology and the empirical results of our study. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Theoretical Framework
In this section, we introduce a simple theoretical model that helps in motivating the modeling choices
in the subsequent empirical analysis. The model is used as a roadmap to understand the impact of
weather anomalies on migration ﬂows. For this aim we built a simpliﬁed model that is able to describe
the mechanisms underlying the link from weather anomalies to rural-urban and urban-international
migration, allowing for the amenity as well as the economic geography channel.
In the following framework, a change in any variable xt over time is denoted by ˙ xt, the derivative by
a subscript. We assume that there exists a mass 1 agricultural workers that may work in the rural sector
or in the urban sector. These workers are thus mobile across sectors. A share Lt ∈ [0,1] constitutes
agricultural workers who work in the urban sector, while 1 − Lt work in the rural sector. There are
Nt ∈ [0,1] urban workers that only work in the urban sector but are mobile across countries. There are
two sectors, the rural sector with production technology Y a(c,1 − Lt), where c denotes weather, and
the urban sector with Y u(Nt + Lt,Nt). Both productions exploit decreasing returns to scale in labor.3
Weather is assumed to affect total productivity in the rural sector. One would ideally want to
measure weather through a random variable, say z, with support z ∈ [0,∞]. Zero would then represent
the best outcome, while inﬁnity would designate the worst. On average we would expect the outcome
E(z) =
R ∞
0 zf(z)dz, with f(z) denoting the probability function. In order to allow for a concise
3Our assumption on decreasing returns to scale in agricultural production could be questioned on the grounds of the
replication argument. An obvious remedy in this case is to assume the existence of another factor of production, like land
X, that is constant, non-tradable and unpriced, such that Y a = Y a(c,1 − Lt,X), with Y a now being homogeneous of
degree 1 in land and labor. This would preserve the results presented above. One could even go one step further and assume
that the new factor of production earns a return itself, but that this return is the residual proﬁt from production. In any case,
the decreasing returns to scale in labor are a crucial assumption that cannot be dispensed of if one wants the model to have
an interior solution.
6and precise theoretical analysis, and without an important loss of generality, we shall avoid modeling
weather as a stochastic process here. Hence, we simply denote a random draw from the distribution
f(z) as c > 0. On average, we would thus expect that c = E(z), while a year with a worse outcome
would imply c > E(z).4
We take capital and knowledge as given and being encompassed in the total factor productivities.
Both sectors price competitively and prices in each sector are given. The rural sector produces accord-
ing to wa(1 − Lt,c) = paY a
1−L, with wa
1−L < 0, wa
c < 0 and limL→1 wa = ∞. The optimal wage in
the urban sector is given by wu(Lt + Nt,Nt) = puY u
L, with wu
L < 0,wu
N < 0. While the ﬁrst part of
wu reﬂects the total amount of workers active in the urban sector, the second part stands for a Mar-
shallian externality on productivity that arises from labor sharing, input-output linkages or information
(Duranton and Puga, 2004). It represents agglomeration effects.5 Workers compare their wages across
sectors and countries and migrate in case they obtain higher wages elsewhere. Within this framework,
agricultural workers then decide to move from the rural to the urban region according to
˙ Lt = w
u(Lt + Nt,Nt) − w
a(1 − Lt,c). (1)
Thus, the amount of agricultural workers that work in the urban sector increases if the wage in the
urban sector is higher than in the rural one.
As for international migration, we assume that urban workers compare their wage at home with
the wage of the country they intend to migrate to, denoted by w∗(1 − Nt); and a direct weather effect,
4In this way we also avoid the analytics associated with a system of stochastic differential equations and a stochastic
steady state. Though mathematically feasible, we would not learn more about migration dynamics.
5Functional forms consistent with these assumptions are, e.g., Y a = A(c)(1 − Lt)α, α ∈ (0,1), A(c) > 0 with
A0(c) < 0, where A denotes total factor productivity in the rural sector that is negatively affected by weather anomalies,
represented by c > 0. Also, Y u = B(Nt)(Lt + Nt)β, where BN > 0 is the marginal effect of N on the Marshallian
externality, β ∈ (0,1) is the elasticity of labor.
7given by g(c), with gc > 0.
We assume that workers that migrate have a negative impact on the other country’s wage, such
that w∗
1−N < 0. The term g(c) assumes that weather anomalies also have a direct impact on urban
workers through a change in the amenity value of the weather at home. It should capture what we
dubbed the amenity channel. For sub-Saharan Africa, we expect such amenities to reﬂect non-market
costs induced by weather anomalies such as poor environmental quality, possible spread of diseases
like malaria, denge or meningitis and consequently increasing numbers of deaths (World Bank, 2010).
Thus, workers from the urban region migrate internationally according to
˙ Nt = w
u(Lt + Nt,Nt) − w
∗(1 − Nt) − g(c). (2)
As such, urban workers migrate if the net international wage exceeds the wage they would otherwise
obtain in the urban sector at home or if the amenity channel is very strong. From now, the subscript t
is dropped for presentation purpose.
Assumption 1. We assume that (1) limL→0 wa(1 − L,c) < w∗(1 − N) + g(c); (2) wu(L,0) >
w∗(1) + g(c); and (3) wu(L + 1,1) < w∗(0) + g(c).
The ﬁrst part of this assumption basically means that, if all agricultural workers were to stay in the
rural sector, then the international wage must be higher than the rural wage. If it were lower, then there
would be no reason for moving into the urban sector and we would see a corner solution in L. The
second and third parts of the assumption simply require the national wage to be sufﬁciently responsive
to international migration. All three conditions are weak and straight-forward.
We are now ready to study this rather intuitive model of weather anomalies inducing rural-urban
and urban-international migration.
8Proposition 1. At equilibrium, a larger weather anomaly induces international migration through
rural-to-urban migration.
Proof. We assume that ˙ N = ˙ L = 0. Combining then (1) with (2) gives the equilibrium condition
w∗(1 − N) + g(c) = wa(1 − L,c). Since w∗(1 − N) + g(c) > 0, by Assumption 1 and limL→1 wa =
∞, then there exists an interior solution in L. Taking now the interior solution of L as given, then
Assumption 1 also assures an interior solution in N. Deriving the weather anomalies’ impact on the
































Hence, the proposition follows.
Thus, weather anomalies increase rural-to-urban migration as well as urban-to-international migra-
tion. Additionally, a stronger amenity effect induces a larger international migration directly, which
increases the wage in the urban sector at home and therefore gives further incentives for rural-urban
migration. The larger the effect of weather anomalies in the rural sector, the more pronounced will be
the rural-urban migration, and the larger will be the international migration.
The next proposition derives the equilibrium dynamics of this model.
Proposition 2. The system of equations (1) and (2) has an asymptotically stable equilibrium point
{¯ L, ¯ N}.
Proof. By Proposition 1 we know that there exists an interior equilibrium solution in L and N that we
denote as {¯ L, ¯ N}, where {¯ L, ¯ N} solves ˙ N = 0 and ˙ L = 0. We derive the Jacobian around the steady
9state {¯ L, ¯ N}. This is given by
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we know that either both eigenvalues are negative or complex with negative real part. Thus, the equi-
librium point {¯ L, ¯ N} is asymptotically stable. Disregarding complex dynamics for simplicity, this
implies that λ1 < 0 and λ2 < 0.
As a consequence, we know that, given a change in the weather conditions, both L and N will
converge to a unique, interior steady state.
The storyline that we suggest here is capturing what we believe to be the most reasonable underly-
ing processes for weather-induced migration decisions. Figure 1 illustrates the migration mechanisms
graphically. Assume we are at the equilibrium point {L,N}, and now the weather condition in the
sending country worsens, such that dc > 0. This has two immediate effects. Firstly, the wage in
the rural sector shrinks, thus shifting the wa curve down. This brings forth incentives for rural-urban
migration. At the same time, there is a direct effect from the amenity value of the environment which
induces incentives for urban-international migration. However, due to the inﬂow of agricultural work-
ers into the urban sector, the wage in the urban sector decreases (per unit of N), and therefore the curve
wu shifts down. This gives further incentives for urban-international migration. Due to the Marshal-
lian externality, this effect is not as pronounced as it otherwise would be. International factor price
10equalization is then achieved via two channels. International migration has a positive effect on inter-
national wage via agglomeration forces and a negative effect via decreasing returns to scale to labor.
Conversely, the urban wage will increase, as shown by the shift of the wu curve in the left panel. Given
assumption 2, the later effect will dominate the former, leading to a decrease in the foreign country’s
wage. We thus arrive at a new equilibrium point that is given by {L0,N0}.
Simple comparative statics furthermore suggest that a stronger agglomeration effect would ﬂatten
the curve wu and thereby diminish the change in international wages. Without the direct effect of the
amenity value of weather, the curve w∗(1 − N) + g(c) would not shift up and therefore international
migration would be lower. Similarly, with little international migration, the curve wu in the left part of
Figure 1 would shift up by less, the effect being a lower amount of sectoral migration.6
To complete the analysis we now derive the effect of weather anomalies on several variables that
give us crucial hints for the way we should set up the empirical analysis.
We, ﬁrstly, derive the effect of weather anomalies on urbanization. We here deﬁne urbanization as
ψ = (L + N)/(1 + N).
Proposition 3. Weather anomalies increase equilibrium urbanization if the amenity channel is weak
enough and agglomeration forces are sufﬁciently small.














6The direction of the changes presented here rests crucially on the assumption that wu
N < 0. If agglomeration forces
were stronger than the diminishing returns to labor in production, then it could be possible that some effects are reversed.
However, it seems rather natural for us to assume that wages are more responsive to migration than to agglomeration effects.
This is also what we conﬁrm in the subsequent empirical analysis.
11Substituting for dN
















Then (1 + N)(wu
N + w∗
1−N) − (1 − L)wu
L < 0 implies
dψ
dc > 0.
This result may be explained as follows. Since weather anomalies induce rural-urban migration,
then the subsequent decrease in the urban wage will induce international migration. As a consequence,
we see an increase in urbanization, since both the number of inhabitants decreases and the number of
rural workers in the rural sector decreases. This holds unless the amenity effect of g(c) is too strong or
if the residual of wu
N − wu
L, representing the effect of N on the agglomeration externality, is too large.
The next proposition derives the amenity channel.
Proposition 4. A stronger amenity channel leads to out-migration.
Proof. The amenity effect is given by the effect of g(c) on N only. By equation (4), this effect is
negative.
Therefore, the stronger the effect of weather anomalies on the amenity value at home, the more will
urban workers be inclined to migrate abroad. We dub this the amenity channel since it explains how
weather anomalies affect migration directly without going through other variables like urbanization or
wages.
Our ﬁnal proposition is related to a country’s exposure to weather anomalies. We deﬁne a country
that is depending on one sector as one where that sector produces a relatively larger share of GDP.
Proposition 5. The more depending a country is on the rural sector, the stronger the impact of weather
anomalies on migration.
12Proof. From the proﬁt functions we know that a higher c implies a lower Y a versus Y u. Furthermore,
from equation (3) we know that L at steady state is increasing in c. From equation (4), the proposition
thus follows.
This result seems rather intuitive. Take any country whose GDP is highly exposed to weather
anomalies, then one will also see a larger impact of weather anomalies on the country that is more
exposed. This exposure term might be very low for countries that are more urbanized and, thus, whose
production is mostly independent of weather anomalies, like countries with a larger manufacturing
sector. It could, however, be large for those countries that are very dependent on the agricultural sector
and where even small changes in the weather conditions might lead to a signiﬁcant exposure of a large
share of GDP.
This framework leaves out several aspects. For example, it has been established that migrants move
with their demands and can affect consumer prices (Saiz, 2007; Lach, 2007) as well as the proﬁtability
oflocallyprovidedgoodsandservices. Inaddition, migrantscanalsoconstitutecomplementaryfactors
in the production of the receiving countries and strengthen agglomeration economies (Ottaviano and
Peri, 2011). We did not allow for changes in prices, (costly) trade in goods or ﬁrm re-allocations, and
introduced agglomeration effects as well as consumer surplus considerations in a somewhat stylized
way. Nevertheless, we believe that the model captures the crucial qualitative links of rural-urban and
urban-international migration.
Another point could be that the sending country is a small economy. In this case one would expect
that the receiving country’s wage is not responsive to international migration, such that w∗ = ¯ w∗.
Though this does not qualitatively change the results presented above, we are likely to see a larger
rural-urban and a larger international migration from the small country. The reason is that, in this case,
13international migration does not drive down the receiving country’s wage and, as a consequence, more
international migration is necessary to restore equilibrium.
3 Empirical analysis
Since Todaro (1980) and the review of Yap (1977), it has become standard in the literature to relate,
in an aggregate migration form, the migration rate to changes in expected income and to changes in
the degree of urbanisation (see also Taylor and Martin (2001)). We will not depart from this tradi-
tion. However, Propositions 1, 3 and 4 of our theoretical framework not only point to the importance
of the amenity channel but also to the economic geography (via income and urbanization) channel
through which weather anomalies could affect international migration. The theoretical model and its
discussion also shed light on possible risks of endogeneity. As discussed above, the self-reinforcing
and cumulative nature of migration makes economic wealth and the level of urbanisation potentially
endogenous variables. Therefore, we develop a three-equation model, with one equation for the net
migration rate, one for GDP per capita and one for the level of urbanisation. We collect a new dataset
of 39 sub-Saharan African countries with yearly data from 1960-2000. This cross-country panel data
consists of variables on migration, variables describing the weather characteristics, the economic and
demographic situations, as well as several country-speciﬁc variables. The country list can be found in
Table 1 in the Appendix. Our three-equation model is formulated as follows:













= γ0 + γ1WeatherAr,t + γ2 (WeatherAr,t ∗ AGRIr) + γZr,t + γR,t + γr + ￿r,t(6)
log(URBr,t) = θ0 + θ1WeatherAr,t + θ2 (WeatherAr,t ∗ AGRIr) + θZr,t + θR,t + θr + ￿r,t (7)
This baseline model suggests that MIGRr,t, which represents average net migration rates, can be
explained by a set of weather variables (weather anomalies, deﬁned below) WeatherAr,t; by per capita
GDP (GDPpcr,t) as a proxy for domestic wage; by the foreign per capita GDP, i.e. average per capita
GDP in the other SSA countries weighted by the distance to country r (GDPpc−r,t); by the share of
the urban population (URBr,t) as well as by a vector of control variables (Zr,t), described below. As
suggested by Propositions 1 and 3, we also allow weather anomalies to affect international migration
through the economic geography channel, which works its way through per capita GDP and the level
of urbanisation. Proposition 5 also invites us to assess the differentiated impact of weather variables in
countries whose economies largely depend on the agricultural sector. We introduce, therefore, interac-
tion terms (WeatherAr,t ∗ AGRIr), where AGRIr is an “agricultural” dummy, which as in Dell et al.
(2009) equals 1 for an above median agricultural GDP share in 1995.7 Denoting α ∈ {β,γ,θ}, we
also control for any time-constant source of country heterogeneity by the use of country ﬁxed effects
αr and for phenomena common to all countries across time through the introduction of time dummies,
αt. We also follow Dell et al. (2009) in introducing a time-region ﬁxed effect, αR,t, thus controlling
7We follow Dell et al. (2009, footnote 10) in using 1995 data for agricultural share because data coverage for earlier
years is sparse.
15for the importance of changes in the regional patterns of migration in sub-Saharan Africa (Adebusoye,
2006).
3.1 Variables description
Data are collected from several sources to compute the variables introduced in the system of equations
above. Descriptive statistics are provided in Tables 2 and 3 (Table 1 in the supplementary material
offers a detailed description with data sources for the different variables).
• MIGRr,t: The net migration rate is deﬁned as the difference between immigrants and emigrants
per thousands of population, corrected by net refugee ﬂows (see below). Typically research on
international migration uses bilateral data on migration ﬂows or stocks to analyze migration into
developed countries. However, such data is barely available for developing countries and par-
ticularly difﬁcult to obtain for Africa (over a longer period). The reason is that cross-border
migration in sub-Saharan Africa is poorly documented (Zlotnik, 1999).8 Thus, we do not use
directly observable data for international migration. Like Hatton and Williamson (2003), we
rely on net migration ﬂows as a proxy for cross-border migration. This data is available for the
period 1960-2000 and provided by the US Census Bureau. The data is constructed from a com-
bination of directly observable international migration data based on ofﬁcial population registers
and indirect observations, i.e. migration estimates using a variety of sources, including censuses,
surveys, and administrative records.9 Moreover, as Hatton and Williamson (2003), we account
8Directly observable cross-border migration data for Africa can be found in the United Nations Demographic Yearbooks
and in the ILO’s International Migration Database, but the number of entries is very scarce. In order to deal with the lack
of bilateral migration data and to control for possible spatial dependency introduced by such data constraint, we exploit
spatial weighting matrices in order to capture the inﬂuence of some variables in neighboring countries. In line with the
seminal work of Ravenstein (1885) on the role of distance in migration ﬂows, such a weighting also constitutes a way to
take into account the costs of migration across borders, which should be positively correlated with distance (Clark, 1986).
9The US Census Bureau’s strategy to construct its migration data series can be summarized as follows. First, the US
16for refugees who are driven by non-economic factors and included in the net migration estimates.
To do so, we subtract the refugee movement from the net migration rate. In fact, the US Census
includes net refugee movements in its net migration series by using UNHCR refugee data. Using
the same source (UNHCR, 2009), we compute the net refugee movement (NetREF), which is
expressed per thousand of the country’s population, as the difference between the change in the
stock of refugees living in a country (change in refugees residing in country r) and the change
in the stock of refugees from that country living elsewhere (change in refugees originating from
country r). Nevertheless, our robustness analysis reveals that proceeding or not to such a correc-
tion in the dependent variable leaves our main ﬁndings unchanged (see Section 3.4).
• WeatherAr,t: Weather variables should capture the incentives for migration that come through
weather anomalies. In line with the climatology literature (see for example, Nicholson, 1986,
1992; Munoz-Diaz and Rodrigo, 2004), we use anomalies in precipitations and in temperature.
The anomalies are computed as the deviations from the country’s long-term mean, divided by
its long-run standard deviation. Rainfall and temperature data originate from the IPCC (Mitchell
et al., 2002). Like Barrios et al. (2010), we take the long-run to be the 1901-2000 period and
denote the weather anomaly WeatherA, which represents either rainfall anomaly (RAIN) or tem-
Census Bureau uses direct net international migration observations from country censuses on foreign born population or
data from general sources such as Eurostat, the International Labor Organization (ILO), International Organization for
Migration (IOM), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Net migration can be estimated
for the intercensal period from census data, especially when it contains information such as place of birth of the foreign-
born population or date of arrival and departure. Second, when no or few direct migration observations are available, the US
Census relies on indirect estimation techniques, which are applied through an iterative process to generate most accurate
results (US Census, 2010, p.22-26). For instance, the census cohort analysis attributes irregularities in the comparison of
population by year of birth across two or more censuses to net migration. The residual technique calculates net migration
as differences between observed census population distribution and population distribution resulting from a population
projection that accounts for natural increases but not migration (US Census, 2010, p.22-26). The residual technique is
likely to include illegal and undocumented migrants compared to the more direct, observational approach.







where WeatherAlevel,r,t stands for the level of either rainfall or temperature of country r in year t,
and µLR
r (WeatherAlevel) and σLR
r (WeatherAlevel) are country r’s mean value and standard devia-
tion, respectively, in rainfall or temperature over the long-run (LR) reference period. As pointed
out by Barrios et al. (2010), anomalies allow one to eliminate possible scale effects and take ac-
count of the likelihood that for the more arid countries variability is large compared to the mean
(Munoz-Diaz and Rodrigo, 2004). The long-term mean gives an idea of the ‘normal’ weather
conditions of a particular region. Anomalies thus describe in how far the weather conditions
depart from this normal in a given year.10
• GDPpcr,t: GDP per capita is used as a proxy for the domestic wage. A comparison with the
‘foreign’ wage should reﬂect an individual’s economic incentives to migrate. In the tables we use
the short hand notations y for this variable. One problem for directly translating the theoretical
framework into an empirical one is that we do not have separate data on rural and urban wages.
This is, however, of a lesser problem for the following reasons. Firstly, according to our theo-
retical framework, weather impacts the rural wage and using GDP per capita is a compromise
that may, nevertheless, be a good proxy for the average wage. Secondly, our theoretical frame-
work predicts that weather anomalies drive rural and urban wages in the same direction. Thus,
whenever weather anomalies reduce rural wages then they also drive down urban wages. This
implies that average wages, proxied by our GDP per capita, fall. Furthermore, the more easily
10Since the anomaly transformation provides a partial correction to year-to-year ﬂuctuations, the reader should keep in
mind that we are capturing deviations in the weather from the norm.
18migrants can move between rural and urban areas the more quickly will the wage differential
between both areas be minimized.
• GDPpc−r,t: Foreign GDP per capita proxies the ‘foreign’ wage, i.e. the wage outside the home
country, and is measured as average GDP per capita in the other countries of the sample weighted
by a distance function
PN
s=1 f(dr,s)wages,t, where f(dr,s) = 1/(dr,s)2.11 In the tables we use
the short hand notations yF for this variable.
• URBr,t: Urban population is deﬁned as the ratio of urban to total population in each country
and originates from the United Nations (2009).
• Zr,t: Our baseline regression includes a set of control variables. The occurrence of war seeks
to capture the political motivations to migrate. Data on the number of internal armed conﬂicts
(WAR) are used. This is particularly relevant in the case of Africa where internal conﬂict have
been by far the dominant form of conﬂict since the late 1950s (Gleditsch et al., 2002). We
expect a negative sign, as war should lead to out-migration. Forced migration is undeniably an
important feature of migration in Africa. Between the early 80’s and the mid 90’s, Africa hosted
30% to 45% of the world total refugee stock. The number of refugees in Africa has increased
from 1960 to 1995, but due to resolution of conﬂicts, important repatriations were made possible
since the 1990’s. Nevertheless, refugees accounted for a large share of the total migrant stock in
11Although Head and Mayer (2004) warn against giving a structural estimation to this proxy, the ‘foreign’ wage could
be interpreted as the Real Market Potential introduced by Harris (1954). It is unfortunately not possible to proceed to
the Redding and Venables (2004) estimation of the real market potential on the investigated period, given the lack of
bilateral trade data availability before 1993 (Bosker and Garretsen, 2008). We use distance data from the CEPII (Mayer
and Zignago, 2006), and more speciﬁcally the simple distance calculated following the great circle formula, which uses
latitudes and longitudes of the most important city (in terms of population). The Foreign GDP per capita is therefore
constructed by making the less restrictive assumption regarding migration costs, i.e. increasing linearly with distance. As
indicated in Section 3.4., our results are nonetheless robust to alternative proxies for migration barriers, including colonial
link, contiguity, common colonial ruler and linguistic proximity.
19Africa passing from 25% in 1980, to 33% in 1990 and to 22% in 2000 (Zlotnik, 2003).12 We also
follow Hatton and Williamson (2003) in introducing four country-speciﬁc policy dummies. For
example, Hatton and Williamson (2003) suggest to control for the large expulsion of Ghanaian
migrants by the Nigerian government in 1983 and 1985.
• Time-regional dummies are introduced using the grouping described in Table 1 of the Appendix.
This should capture the regional pattern of migration underlined by several authors. In fact,
across-border migration in sub-Saharan African is not distributed evenly across regions. In 2000,
42% of the international migrants in Africa lived in countries of Western Africa, 28% in Eastern
Africa, 12% in Northern Africa, and 9% in each Middle and Southern Africa (Zlotnik, 2003:5).
Moreover, trans-boundary migration occurs often among countries of the same region, as regions
have their own attraction poles and economic grouping, e.g. the Economic Community of West
Africa States, the Southern African Development Community and the Common Market of East
and Southern Africa (Adebusoye, 2006). Surveys of the population aged 15 years and older
carried out showed that, in 1993, 92% of all the foreigners in Ivory Coast, which is a main
attraction pole for migrants in the region, originated from seven other countries in Western Africa
(Zlotnik, 1999).
Figures 2.a and 2.b plot net migration rate against rainfall and temperature anomalies, respectively,
for the 39 sub-Saharan African countries of the sample over the period 1960-2000. Temperature is on
an increasing track whereas rainfall exhibits a decreasing pattern, indicating that sub-Saharan Africa
12Given the fact that migration data incorporate refugee ﬁgures, we do not follow Hatton and Williamson (2003) in
introducing net numbers of refugee ﬂows as an explanatory variable. It would generate an obvious endogeneity problem
due to the simultaneity between this additional variable and the dependent variable. We prefer to substract the net refugee
ﬂows directly from our dependent variable. Still, we will show that results are not fundamentally changed when we follow
Hatton and Williamson (2003)’s approach. Our estimation also differs from the one of Hatton and Williamson (2003) in
the sense that we include a country ﬁxed effect while their paper uses a Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) estimation.
An F-test unambiguously conﬁrms the presence of unobserved ﬁxed effects and the Hausman test unambiguously supports
the use of a ﬁxed effect model over a random effect one.
20is experiencing weather changes over the period of our investigation. Moreover, Barrios et al. (2006)
stress that rainfall in sub-Saharan Africa remained constant during the ﬁrst part of the 20th century
until the 1950s, peaking in the late 1950s and being on a clear downward trend since that peak. While
weather variables indicate clear trends, average net migration does not. Thus, judging purely based on
correlation, it is difﬁcult to state whether net migration rate and rainfall/temperature anomalies move
together. Furthermore, our identiﬁcation strategy exploits year-to-year anomalies of temperature and
rainfall anomalies within countries that cannot be observed in the averaged series of Figures 2.a and
2.b.
Given the relatively long time period used, the non-stationary nature of our variables may be a
point of concern, leading to possible spurious relationships (Maddala and Wu, 1999). We perform
the Fisher panel data unit root test on the dependent and the explanatory variables (see Table 2 in
the supplementary material). The tests show that all series are stationary at any reasonable level of
conﬁdence.
3.2 Dealing with endogeneity
Despite the introduction of region-time dummies which are likely to capture some time-speciﬁc and
time-region-speciﬁc events, we might be in trouble if an unobserved effect is both country-speciﬁc and
time-variant. For example, the reputation of migrants or the presence of people with the same nation-
ality could accumulate over time and be speciﬁc to some countries. There is some evidence for what is
called the ‘friends and relative’ argument, i.e. the fact that migrants are attracted to locations to which
they already have some relations (see Hatton and Williamson, 2003). Assume that the presence of
migrants from the same nationality would affect GDP per capita negatively, it means that our estimates
might be biased downward. Another source of time-varying unobserved effect could result from some
21form of ‘selective’ migration policy introduced both in terms of skills and countries of origin by some
OECD countries. Such factors could impact GDP per capita and potentially affect migration through
another channel than these economic variables. Also, a causal interpretation could be problematic
given the potential simultaneity problems that threaten the estimation of some variables. Although
empirically the causality from migration to wages is at best weak, we cannot neglect this possibility.13
Our theoretical framework clearly points to a potential simultaneity, since migrants move with their
demand for goods and affect the production in the receiving countries, and thereby alter wages in both
the country of origin and the destination country.
To be more precise, our theoretical model suggests that rainfall and temperature anomalies affect
the incentives to migrate through an amenity as well as an economic geography channel. Though
the amenity channel poses no challenge econometrically, the existence of the economic geography
channel hints at possible endogeneities. The two main variables that comprise the economic geography
channel are, according to our theoretical contribution, wages and urbanization. Given the results of our
theoretical model as well as those in Barrios et al. (2006) we are well-aware that the size of the urban
population is likely to be endogenous to wages, weather anomalies and several control variables. An
increase in urbanization should theoretically increase the incentives to further migrate as migrants
move with their income and strengthen agglomeration forces. This is what is usually referred to as the
home market effect (Krugman, 1991).
One approach to deal with this simultaneity issue is by resorting to instrumental variables in a ﬁxed
effect framework that copes with unobserved time-constant and time-region heterogeneity. One of the
difﬁculties is to ﬁnd a valid instrumental variable that will not affect the net migration rate through
13Among others, Card (1990), Friedberg and Hunt (1995), Hunt (1992) as well as Ottaviano and Peri (2011) cannot ﬁnd
empirical evidence supporting this causal link. With the exception of Maystadt and Verwimp (2009) who study the issue in
the particular context of refugee hosting, no similar assessment has been undertaken in the African context.
22another channel than the potentially endogenous variable. In regression (1), we instrument GDP per
capita with the absolute growth in the money supply. The relevance of this candidate rests on the
importance of monetary variables in determining GDP variation.
Indeed, one of the most familiar rules in monetary policy is the Taylor rule, which links monetary
policy with inﬂation and the output gap. Under this rule, which is followed by e.g. the Fed in the
US, deviations from the potential output should induce monetary policy actions, thus making money
supply, at least for the US, endogenous to GDP. However, sub-Saharan African countries, just like the
Euro area countries, do not follow the Taylor rule but focus only on ﬁghting inﬂation. This is also
conﬁrmed in Kasekende and Brownbridge (2011),14 who write that “[t]he implementation of monetary
targeting frameworks in sub-Saharan Africa has, in practice, paid little attention to the stabilization
of output.” As a result, monetary policy in sub-Saharan Africa can be viewed as clearly monetarist in
nature. Hence, bychangingthemoneysupply, policymakersareabletoinducechangesininterestrates
which affect the incentives for investments, and thereby production and wages. Indeed, contractions
in the money supply have been shown to be the source of such strong contractions in production as
those during the Great Depression (Friedman and Schwartz, 1971), or as such large expansions as
the Great Moderation (Brunnermeier (2008); Bean (2010); Cecchetti (2009)). The channels through
which monetary policy may affect production are now well-studied, and include direct channels like
the interest rate channel, or indirect ones, like the credit channels (see Cecchetti (1995); Gertler and
Bernanke (1995); Mishkin (1996)). Hence, especially in countries with inﬂation targets like the sub-
Saharan African countries, the causality clearly goes from monetary policy to GDP.
14The authors are Deputy Governor and Economic Advisor to the Governor at the central bank of Uganda.
233.3 Results
We present the main results of this article in Table 4. As predicted by the theoretical model we ﬁnd
both robust and statistically signiﬁcant evidence for both the amenity channel and the economic geog-
raphy channel. With respect to the amenity channel, we ﬁnd that weather anomalies in agriculturally-
dominated countries induce out-migration. Thus, this supports the existence of environmental non-
economic (non-market) pure externalities that exacerbate the incentives to move to another country.
Similar evidence has been obtained by Rappaport and Sachs (2003) and Rappaport (2007) for the case
of the US, and by Cheshire and Magrini (2000) for Europe. These articles suggest that weather-related
migration, in richer regions like the US or Europe, may be due to a larger relative valuation of the
environment from rising per capita income. For sub-Saharan Africa, it seems unlikely that the amenity
channel is due to the fact that people simply want to live in places with nicer weather per se. Instead,
we would more strongly emphasize the view that the amenity channel most likely captures health-
related or risk-reducing migration. Health-related migration should be mainly due to weather anoma-
lies spreading diseases like malaria, denge or meningitis (World Bank, 2010). Indeed, sub-Saharan
Africa is the region in the world with most deaths from malaria or similar diseases. Risk-reducing
migration is likely due to the fact that a period of weather anomalies may be associated with higher
future risks15 and, consequently, migration might occur as a preventive step. Similar reasons have been
forwarded by Gutmann and Field (2010) who emphasize why not all previous inhabitants returned in
the aftermath of the hurricanes Katrina or Andrew.
With respect to the economic geography channel, we ﬁnd the following. Firstly, weather anomalies
clearlyimpactwages(proxiedbyrelativeGDPpercapita). Thisresult, thus, conﬁrmsandcomplements
previous works by Barrios et al. (2010). Furthermore, sub-Saharan African countries that have a large
15There is evidence that climatic variables help in explaining malaria transmission (Kiszewski et al., 2004).
24agricultural sector are particularly vulnerable. In regressions (1), (3) and (7), temperature anomalies
have a negative impact on the GDP per capita ratio, in line with the ﬁndings in Dell et al. (2009).16
The interaction term of rainfall anomalies and the dummy for above-median agricultural added value
(AGRI) have the expected positive sign. Given the signiﬁcant and positive coefﬁcient of the GDP
per capita ratio in the second stage of the estimation procedure (see (2), (5), (6) and (9)), weather
anomalies increase the incentives to migrate out of one’s country of origin, particularly in countries
that are highly dependent on the agricultural sector.
InlinewithBarriosetal.(2006), weatheranomaliesstrengthentheurbanizationprocessinagriculturally-
dominated countries.17 Given the role of agglomeration economies, such an increase in urbanization
constitutes an attraction force for international migrants. This is consistent with the mechanism de-
scribed in our theoretical framework where decreased rural wages lead to a larger urban concentration,
while in turn, stronger agglomeration forces provide incentives for in-migration. This result also ﬁnds
support both with empirical New Economic Geography studies on the role of urbanization in attracting
migrants (Head and Mayer, 2004) and more descriptive evidence on the importance of international
migrants in African cities (Beauchemin and Bocquier, 2004). Given its positive and signiﬁcant coef-
ﬁcient in the second-stage of the regressions, urbanization softens the impact of weather anomalies
16This result is useful in that it supports the assumption that temperature affects GDP which is the foundation for the
whole integrated assessment literature, see e.g. Nordhaus (2008).
17Further analyses (available from the authors) show that our results on rainfall differ from those in Barrios et al. (2006)
because we have a different sample (migration data causes a reduction in the sample size). Although non-signiﬁcant, our
coefﬁcients have a similar effect on urbanization, in terms of magnitude, as Barrios et al. (2006). They ﬁnd that a one
percent decrease in rainfall (i.e. -10 mm per year and per country) yields a 0.45 percent increase in urbanization. Our
(non-signiﬁcant) rainfall coefﬁcients indicate that a one percent decrease in rainfall induces a 0.98 percent (unweighted
country average) and a 0.81 percent (population-weighted average) increase in urbanization. We note that even though
temperature anomalies dominate in our sample, results on other samples e.g. Henry et al. (2003), Barrios et al. (2006) or
regions (Munshi, 2003, for Mexico) emphasize the role of rainfall, while yet others push the importance of temperature
alone (Dillon et al., 2010; Burke et al., 2009). Thus, though different samples ﬁnd robust results for an impact from
weather anomalies, they differ in whether rainfall or temperature is the main driver. Since both drive evapotranspiration,
the differences in results may arise through the possibility that for some countries, evapotranspiration is more strongly
driven by temperature while in others rain might be more important simply due to differences in geographic conditions or
the local ﬂora and fauna.
25on international migration. Section 3.5 discusses which channels outweigh for international migration
and provides estimates of the effect of weather anomalies on international migration.18
These results hinge crucially on the use of our three regressions, instrumental variables framework.
As we argued above, only a uniﬁed framework may be able to simultaneously account for the channels
that we identiﬁed within our theoretical framework. Thus, for consistency we describe our use of the
instruments in more detail now. Our ﬁrst-stage regression conﬁrms that a decline in the growth of
money is statistically associated with a fall in GDP per capita. A decrease by a standard deviation
in money growth should reduce relative GDP per capita by about 11%. In regressions (3) to (5), we
show results under overidentifying restrictions by introducing two additional instruments. We use a
dummy indicating whether a country experienced the two ﬁrst years of independence, as well as the
interaction of this variable with a dummy that takes the value one if that country has been colonized
by the UK colonial power. According to Miller and Singh (1994)’s catch-up hypothesis and consistent
with the results of Barrios et al. (2006), restrictions on internal movements during colonial times have
been followed by a strong urbanization after independence.19 This has been particularly the case in
former British colonies whose administration favored the establishment of new colonial urban centers
(Falola and Salm, 2004). Although Figure 2 does not seem to depict a different trajectory in net
18Our preferred speciﬁcation (3)-(5) yields average partial effects (APE) of rainfall and temperature in agriculturally-
dominated countries (Agri=1) and in countries with below median agricultural GDP share (Agri=0) taking on the following
values: APERAIN,Agri=1=1.07, APERAIN,Agri=0=0, APETEMP,Agri=1=-0.65 and APETEMP,Agri=0=0.53. These values account for
the amenity and economic geography channel of weather on migration.
19Hance (1970, p.223) documents that restrictions on movements to the cities under colonial regimes greatly explain the
low urban levels of less than 10% in the three main Eastern African countries (Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya). According to
Njoh (2003), colonial authorities worked fervently to discourage Africans from living in urban areas. Governments in colo-
nial Africa, and South Africa during the apartheid era, crafted legislation to prevent the rural-to-urban migration of native
Africans. The covert goals of this policy were to preserve the ‘white’ character of the cities and keep the black population
in the rural areas. As reported by Roberts (2003) “colonial relationships between core countries and their dependencies set
the stage for differences in urbanization among less-developed countries. In the colonial situation, provincial cities often
served mainly as administrative and control centers to ensure the channeling for export of minerals, precious metals or the
products of plantations and large estates; but wealth and elites tended to concentrate in the major city. When countries
became independent and began to industrialize, it was these major cities that attracted both population and investment.
They represented the largest and most available markets for industrialists producing for the domestic market. They also
were likely to have the best infrastructure to support both industry and commerce in terms of communications and utilities.”
26migration in the years where most African countries became independent, we cannot exclude a priori
the possibility that state independence has affected cross-border migration by another channel than
rural-urban migration. However, using three instruments with two endogenous variables allows us
to test the exogenous nature of these instruments (overidentiﬁcation test). Beyond the reasonable
nature of the overidentifying restrictions, statistical tests support our conﬁdence in the validity of these
instrumental variables. Provided at least one instrument is valid, the Hansen overidentiﬁcation test
fails to reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation between these instrumental variables and the error
terms. F-tests on excluded instruments equal 30.84 in ﬁrst-stage regression (3) and 12.99 in ﬁrst-
stage regression (4). As suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2009), we also test the robustness of the
results under overidentifying restrictions to the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML)
estimator. Regression (6) indicates that our results are unaltered with the LIML estimator and that
we can reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments. In regressions (7), (8) and (9), we also follow
Angrist and Pischke (2009) in checking the robustness of our results to a just-identiﬁed estimation.
Just-identiﬁed 2SLS is indeed approximately unbiased while the LIML estimator is approximately
median-unbiased for overidentiﬁed models. When just-identiﬁed estimation is implemented, results do
not change whether the dummy for the ﬁrst two years of independence is introduced as an exogenous
explanatory variable or not.
3.4 Robustness
Robustness checks are not shown in the paper (but presented in Section 4 of the supplementary mate-
rial). These robustness checks relate to the use of alternative dependent variables, alternative deﬁnition
of the main explanatory variables of interest and the addition or omission of control variables. Re-
garding the dependent variable, our results are robust to the deﬁnition used by Hatton and Williamson
27(2003), i.e. without subtracting the net refugee ﬂows from the migration rate but introducing them as
an explanatory variable (see Table 5 in the supplementary material). Since now the dependent variable
incorporates the movement of refugees, the net refugee ﬂows (NetREF) exhibit a positive coefﬁcient
which is close to 1. Although it unduly increases the risk of endogeneity, our results are unaltered by
this inclusion.20 Furthermore, we test the robustness of our ﬁndings to an alternative deﬁnition of our
variables of interest (see Table 6 in the supplementary material). Our results are unaltered when rain-
fall and temperature are expressed in levels (with or without logarithmic transformation) rather than in
anomaly terms. Moreover, the inclusion of a foreign-deﬁned version or of lagged values for weather
variables, which do not feature signiﬁcant explanatory power, does not change our main results. Us-
ing alternative deﬁnitions for GDP per capita does not change our ﬁndings. In fact, our main results
are conﬁrmed when replacing GDP per capita by the GDP per worker, using the Chain transforma-
tion instead of the Laspeyres index in the real terms transformation (see Table 7 in the supplementary
material), or exploiting alternative weights in the spatial decay function to compute the foreign wage
(see Table 8 in the supplementary material). These alternative weights include other proxies than the
distance for migration costs, including colonial link, contiguity, a common colonial ruler and linguis-
tic proximity. Moreover, we also test the robustness of our results to the omission of some control
variables (see Table 9 in the supplementary material). Since the works by Miguel et al. (2004), Burke
et al. (2009) and Hsiang et al. (2011), we cannot exclude that weather affects conﬂict and, hence, the
inclusion of the conﬂict variable may wipe out some of the explanatory power of our weather variables.
20Moreover, Hatton and Williamson (2003) point out that demographic pressure is an important determinant of interna-
tional migration. Our main results remain valid when introducing such a demographic variable in our speciﬁcation with
the lagged value of population density, which is signiﬁcant and affects net migration negatively. However, potential endo-
geneity issues induced by the introduction of population density require to be cautious with this speciﬁcation. Furthermore,
the entry into the ACP agreements could also constitute another determinant of international migration. Completing the
data by Head et al. (2010) on the entry into ACP with data for Botswana and Namibia, adding the entry into ACP as an
additional control variable does not alter the main results and shows a non-signiﬁcant coefﬁcient. These results are shown
in the supplementary material.
28Therefore, the inclusion of the conﬂict-related variables may undermine our estimations of weather-
induced migration. Although introducing a potential omitted variable bias, omitting the conﬂict-related
variable does not alter the main results of this paper. Finally, we test the robustness of our results to an
alternative dependent variable, based on bilateral migration ﬂows between our 39 SSA countries and
14 OECD destination countries (see Table 10 in the supplementary material based on data from Ortega
and Peri (2009, 2011)). Results obtained from two-stage estimations like in our baseline conﬁrm our
main ﬁndings of Table 4. Like in Mayda (2010), we ﬁnd that a higher GDP per capita at origin or lower
GDP per capita at destination reduces outmigration. Moreover, these robustness results indicate that
decreased rainfall anomalies increase the economic incentives to migrate from countries highly depen-
dent on the agricultural sector, while temperature anomalies in turn increase that economic incentives.
Our main ﬁndings hold, therefore, also for migration outside Africa.
It is likely that our proxy for the domestic wage could be subject to measurement errors and thus
potentially bias our results.21 Nevertheless, we believe that this should not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence our
results for the following reasons. Firstly, these measurements errors are partly dealt with through
the use of the instrumental variables. Secondly, by restricting the sample to sub-Saharan African
countries, we are more likely to have relatively similar GDP and institutional structures, which is an
important determinant of sound comparisons over time (Deaton and Heston, 2010). Thirdly, we test
the robustness of our results to alternative GDP per capita measurements. Replacing GDP per capita
by GDP per worker or using the Chain transformation instead of the Laspeyres index in the real terms
21One would expect these errors to be largely dependent on the institutional environment in the countries under concern.
In this case, they would not cause any bias if they were constant over time or time-speciﬁc, as we use country- and time-
speciﬁc ﬁxed effects. Nevertheless, since some countries might have experienced institutional changes that induced a
variability in the measurement error then this could potentially leave some room for biases. For example, poor countries
may be more likely to have a less developed statistical capacity and migration data may be more likely to be based on
the residual approach, or more inclusive of illegal and undocumented migrants. Consequently, a change in economic
development and statisticalcapacity may be associated with a change indemographic accounting methodology, forexample
from a residual to an observational approach. In that case, the estimated coefﬁcient of the GDP ratio is likely to feature a
downward bias.
29transformation does not change the main results (see supplementary material).
3.5 Projections
Overall, our results suggest that weather anomalies raise the incentives to migrate to another country.
In this section we provide a tentative estimation of weather-induced migration ﬂows in sub-Saharan
Africa. We ﬁrst estimate the historical migration ﬂows induced by weather anomalies over the period
1960-2000. Subsequently, we provide an end of century projection for the change in migration ﬂows
based on IPCC forecasts for potential weather scenarios and based on population projections from the
UN. Our computations are based on the signiﬁcant coefﬁcients of the weather variables as well as on
the coefﬁcients of the GDP per capita ratio and urbanization in regressions (3) to (5) of Table 4. More
details can be found in the supplementary material.
3.5.1 Historical estimates
We compute the contribution of weather changes to past migration in sub-Saharan Africa over the pe-
riod 1960-2000. Our calculations are based on the signiﬁcant coefﬁcients of our preferred regressions
(3) to (5) in Table 4 and on observed weather data in the 39 countries of our sample. Our ﬁndings yield
that 0.03% of the sub-Saharan African population living in the countries most exposed to weather
anomalies (i.e. highly dependent upon the agricultural sector), was displaced on average each year due
to changes in temperature and precipitations during the second half of the 20th century (see ﬁrst column
of Table 6). Table 6 also indicates the share of this weather-induced migration that is due to rainfall
and temperature as well as the fraction that is due to the amenity effect of weather and to the economic
geography effects (GDP per capita ratio and urbanization). Rainfall changes drove changes in net
migration more strongly than temperature over the period 1960-2000, while weather anomalies affect
30international migration mainly through the economic geography channel, thus economic incentives,
to migrate. This estimate corresponds in net ﬁgures to 128’000 individuals having been displaced on
average every year due to weather anomalies over the period 1960-2000, which represents only about
3% of the 4 million annual internal (rural-urban) migrants caused by weather anomalies. This means
that we estimate that in total, over the period 1960-2000, 5 million people have been displaced due to
weather anomalies. Such a ﬁgure may seem rather low, but given the ‘net’ nature of our dependent
variable, it represents a lower bound estimate.22
3.5.2 End of century projections
To give a rough estimate of the possible consequences of further weather anomalies on migration ﬂows
in sub-Saharan Africa, we can make use of the climate projections described in the Fourth Assessment
Report (AR4) of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC
projections are drawn from various climate models and scenarios and provide estimates on the future
change in regional temperature and precipitation between the periods 1980-1999 and 2080-2099. Our
migration projections are based on weather anomalies given by scenario A1B, which is described in
detail in Chapter 11 of the IPCC report (Christensen et al., 2007, p.854) and its forecasted weather
changes are reproduced in Table 5. This scenario seems reasonable as it assumes greater economic
integration in the future, which is in line with recent economic growth trends of emerging countries
(China, India and even sub-Saharan Africa). Furthermore, assumptions on future green house gas
22We ﬁnd that, in net terms, 0.851 people out of 1000 individuals living in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) left their country
every year over the period 1960-2000. This value is obtained by computing the number of net migrants from countries
with a negative average net migration rates over the period 1960-2000 divided by total SSA population. Similarly, by
focusing on countries with positive average net migration rates, we ﬁnd that 0.637/1000 migrated to another of the 39 SSA
countries of our sample. The difference between these two values, indicates that 0.241/1000 established in another country
of the world. Considering only the effect of weather changes, we ﬁnd that 0.305/1000 left one of the 39 SSA countries,
0.159/1000 found home in another of these 39 countries and 0.146/1000 in another country of the world. This means also
that 35.83% (305/851) of people leaving their country did so because of weather changes.
31emission and world population increase are moderate (see further details in the supplementary mate-
rial).
According to our projections, an additional 0.121% to 0.532% of the sub-Saharan African popula-
tion will be induced to migrate annually due to varying weather conditions towards the end of the 21st
century (see columns 2 to 4 of Table 6). The UN Population Division provides projections of popu-
lation changes over the 21st century according to low-, medium- and high-fertility scenarios (United
Nations, 2009). Applying our projected net migration rates to these estimated population changes
yields, in net terms, a ﬁgure of an additional 2.9 million environmental migrants every year for the pe-
riod 2080-2099 compared to the period 1980-1999 in the low-fertility/best-weather-change scenario.
The results are an additional 25 million migrants in the high-fertility/worse-weather-change scenario.
In order to present country-speciﬁc results we constructed a map.23 While there has been a long
tradition of migration to the coastal agglomerations in Africa (Adebusoye, 2006), coastal areas could
experience a signiﬁcant proportion of their population ﬂeeing toward African mainland due to weather
changes by 2099. West Africa, Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria and Sierra Leone may
be among the most affected countries. In contrast, Eastern Africa, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique,
Tanzania and Uganda may constitute a cluster of sending countries of environmental migrants. South-
ern Africa, Angola and Botswana could become important sources of environmental migrants while
Congo and Gabon could also be pointed out in Central Africa.
Concerning the end of century projections we have to add that, given the non-negligible amounts of
environmental migrants that we estimate, some of our assumptions may not continue to hold. In par-
ticular, there might be a strong divergence between the desire to migrate versus the capacity to do so.24
23For illustrative purposes, the map displays values for Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia and South Africa. These
countries were dropped from our initial sample due to few observations on various variables. To include them in the map,
we applied our coefﬁcients to available data on migration, population and weather for these countries.
24We are grateful to one referee for suggesting this line of thought.
32For example, if there are large and persistent migration ﬂows from one country into another, then the
potential receiving country could restrict migration, just like Europe did for migrants from Africa and
theUSforthosefromMexico. Additionally, problemsofinfrastructureandpropertyrightsmayevolve.
Then, massive population movements could speed up the transmission of epidemic diseases such as
e.g. malaria (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2007) in areas where the population has not yet developed
protective genetic modiﬁcations (Boko et al., 2007). Finally, the expected move towards mainland
Africa could become a major geopolitical concern since population density, ethnic differences and so-
cial disparities have been recognized as factors enhancing conﬂicts; these factors have been argued to
be relevant for the conﬂicts in North-Kivu in Congo, Burundi (Bundervoet, 2009), Rwanda (Andre and
Platteau, 1998) or also Darfur (Fadul, 2006). Naturally, such consequences remain to be veriﬁed both
theoretically and empirically in order to be more afﬁrmative on the relationship between migration
ﬂows and conﬂict onset.
4 Conclusion
The problems associated with weather anomalies certainly rank as one of the important issues of our
times. However, few academic evidence has been provided regarding one of its most often heard
consequences, namely human migration. In this article we propose a theoretical framework featuring
rural-urban-international migration as a consequence of weather anomalies. Our theoretical model
predicts that weather anomalies should work its way into international migration through two channels.
Firstly, the theoretical model predicts that weather anomalies will lead to lower wages, particularly
if the effect of weather anomalies on agricultural production is sufﬁciently strong. This will then
induce agricultural workers to move into the cities in order to ﬁnd work. Weather anomalies are
33therefore a key determinant of urbanization. Such a rural-urban ﬂow, by decreasing the urban wage,
magniﬁes the incentives of the internationally mobile worker to move to another country. However,
due to agglomeration economies, an increase in urbanization tends to mitigate the impact of weather
anomalies on international migration.
We then collect a new dataset for African countries and use the results of our theoretical work
as guidance for an empirical analysis of the impact of weather anomalies on international migration.
Weather anomalies have a signiﬁcant and robust impact on average wages. This result, therefore, sup-
ports the works by Barrios et al. (2010) and Dell et al. (2009), who show that weather anomalies bear
an important impact on GDP per capita. We then ﬁnd that wages are robust and signiﬁcant determi-
nants of international migration. We also obtain that weather anomalies directly affect international
migration, reﬂecting possible pure externality effects of weather anomalies. We dub this the amenity
channel. Second, we observe that weather anomalies increase incentives to move to the cities. Such
a channel of transmission is consistent with the paper of Barrios et al. (2006) who show that weather
anomalies in Africa displace people internally. We also ﬁnd that urban centers represent an attraction
force, thus urbanization softens the impact of weather anomalies on international migration. We label
these effects, via wages and urbanization, the economic geography channel.
Overall we conclude that a minimum of about 5 million people have migrated between 1960 and
2000 due to anomalies in local weather in sub-Saharan Africa. This represents 0.3% of the population
or 128’000 people every year. We then project the impact of weather anomalies on the future rates of
migration in sub-Saharan Africa. Considering the medium-fertility population forecast of the United
Nations, our main results are that in sub-Saharan Africa towards the end of the 21st century every year
an additional 11 million inhabitants may move as a consequence of weather anomalies.
These results impose serious and challenging questions for policy makers. After all, African coun-
34tries account for only approximately ﬁve percent of world emissions. If one believes the academic
literature and the works of the IPCC in that weather anomalies may be human-induced, then these
variations are nearly exclusively driven by the developed world. This externality thus imposed on the
sub-Saharan countries requires international attention based on equity and fairness criteria. In this re-
spect, the recent advances presented in the Cancun Agreement provide a good starting point. However,
one of the important components of the Cancun Agreement, namely Nationally Appropriate Mitigation
Actions, will not be a useful policy tool for Africa due to the relatively low total emissions. Future
policies should therefore focus more closely on adaptation policies. As argued by Collier et al. (2008),
policies aiming at making crops less sensitive to weather anomalies is the most obvious policy recom-
mendation. Easing the market reallocation from agriculture to manufacturing sectors and emphasizing
the absorption role of urban areas will also reduce the social costs of weather anomalies. However, our
paper also qualiﬁes the market-oriented solution promoted by Collier et al. (2008). Speciﬁc policies
easing the factor absorption capacity at national level or compensation mechanisms at supra-national
level should help countries in dealing with the human capital depletion that threatens some of the most
affected countries.
Our projections also warn us about possible consequences in terms of health and security that
such population movements could have on their hosting nations. Provided one is concerned about the
security consequences of environmental migration, strengthening the buffering role of urban centers
may constitute a policy option. In that respect, reducing congestion costs and improving transport
infrastructure may enhance the absorption capacity of agglomeration centers.
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Figure 1: Rural-urban and international migration
a. Rural sector b. Urban sector
46Table 1: Countries
Regions Countries
Central Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Braz-
zaville, Congo Kinshasa, Gabon, Rwanda
East Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda
South Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia,
Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe
West Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Togo
Table 2: Short description of main variables
CODE Deﬁnition/Description
MIGR Net migration rate: Difference between numbers of immigrants and emigrants per
thousands of population, corrected by the refugee movement
RAIN Rain Anomalies, deviations from the country’s long-term mean, divided by its long-
run standard deviation
TEMP Temperature Anomalies: deviations from the country’s long-term mean, divided by
its long-run standard deviation
y/yF GDP per capita over GDP per capita in other African countries weigthed by distance.
WAR War onset, value 1 for civil war onset
WARF War onsets in other countries weigthed by distance
URB Share of urban population in total population
AGRI Whether a country has an agricultural value added above the median in 1995 (similar
to Dell, 2009)
∆ Money Money plus Quasi-Money: Absolute growth in money supply
New State Independence: value 1 if country is in the two ﬁrst years of independence
MIGRa Original net migration rate, without refugee movement correction
NetREF Net refugee movement per thousands of population
A more detailed variable description containing also the different sources for the data is provided in the supplementary
material.
47Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Mean Std Dev Units
MIGR 0.1511 20.657 per 1’000 of population
MIGRa 0.1581 8.930 per 1’000 of population
RAINlevel 1051.2470 578.741 mm
TEMPlevel 24.4440 3.371 Celsius degrees
RAIN -0.3688 0.975 anomalies
TEMP 0.5588 1.063 anomalies
AGRI 0.4347 0.496 1 if country’s agricultural share of GDP is above median
in 1995, 0 otherwise
RAIN*AGRI -0.1583 0.648
TEMP*AGRI 0.2221 0.754
WARt−1 0.0333 0.180 1 if more than 100 deaths, 0 otherwise
WARF
t−1 0.0298 0.059
URB 28.5612 14.725 % of population
(log)URB 3.1931 0.616
log(y/yF) -1.1689 0.836
∆ Money Supply 0.0277 0.140 in 1012 US dollars
New State 0.0053 0.073 1 if country is in 2 ﬁrst years of independence, 0 other-
wise
New State UK 0.0040 0.063 1 if country is in 2 ﬁrst years of independence from UK,
0 otherwise
NetREF -6.69*10−5 18.528 per 1’000 of population
MIGRa stands for net migration rate without the correction for the refugee movement.
Figure 2: Weather anomalies and net migration rate in sub-Saharan Africa
a. Rainfall and net migration b. Temperature and net migration
Source: IPPC for rainfall and temperature data and US Census for net migration.
48Table 4: Two-stage regressions
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Models FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS
LIML
SE robust robust robust robust robust robust robust robust robust
Stage 1st 2nd 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 1st 1st 2nd
Dependent log(y/yF) MIGR log(y/yF) log(URB) MIGR MIGR log(y/yF) log(URB) MIGR
Variable
RAIN -0.0222 1.277 -0.023 -0.00332 0.843 0.843 -0.0231 -0.0034 0.845
[0.0140] [0.978] [0.0140] [0.00832] [0.832] [0.832] [0.0139] [0.00830] [0.833]
TEMP -0.0457*** 2.922** -0.0432*** -0.0204** 2.841** 2.842** -0.0432*** -0.0203** 2.849**
[0.0153] [1.366] [0.0153] [0.00876] [1.239] [1.240] [0.0153] [0.00875] [1.252]
RAIN*AGRI 0.0484*** -2.608** 0.0494*** 0.00162 -1.258 -1.258 0.0495*** 0.0017 -1.26
[0.0187] [1.314] [0.0187] [0.00997] [0.936] [0.936] [0.0187] [0.00995] [0.937]
TEMP*AGRI 0.00702 -1.382 0.00811 0.0455*** -4.253** -4.254** 0.00807 0.0454*** -4.268**
[0.0217] [1.297] [0.0218] [0.00980] [1.693] [1.694] [0.0217] [0.00979] [1.715]
WARt−1 -0.075 6.024 -0.0738 0.0104 2.997 2.997 -0.0738 0.0104 2.996
[0.0877] [7.611] [0.0877] [0.0259] [5.709] [5.710] [0.0876] [0.0259] [5.715]
WARF
t−1 -0.183 7.869 -0.182 0.02 0.86 0.861 -0.182 0.02 0.861
[0.150] [9.281] [0.150] [0.0850] [7.194] [7.195] [0.150] [0.0849] [7.210]
log(y/yF) 52.30** 21.58*** 21.59*** 21.62***
[20.57] [7.216] [7.219] [7.286]
log(URB) 67.51*** 67.53*** 67.83***
[24.14] [24.15] [24.55]
Instruments
∆ Money 0.131** 0.131** 0.0596 0.130** 0.0591
[0.0556] [0.0557] [0.0350] [0.0556] [0.0349]
New State UK -0.641*** 0.230*** -0.671*** 0.194***
[0.0892] [0.0484] [0.0725] [0.0323]
New State -0.0297 -0.0362
[0.0504] [0.0338]
HW-Duma Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Region-Duma Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Time-Duma Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Region-Timea Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Observations 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750
Number of countries 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
F-test 61.85*** 23.23*** 88.87*** 65.79*** 22.17*** 22.17*** 93.85*** 66.36*** 19.33***
F-test on excl. IV 5.51** 30.84*** 12.99*** 46.24*** 19.43***
Underid test 6.796*** 7.595*** 7.595*** 7.124***
P-value Hansen 0.871 0.871
Endo stat 12.98*** 14.53*** 14.53*** 13.26***
Root MSE .2288 13.04 .2283 .09746 10.82 10.82 .2281 .09738 10.84
** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1% (signiﬁcance at 10% not highlighted). Robust standard errors are in square
brackets. y standsfordomesticGDPpercapita, yF standsforforeignGDPpercapita. “HW-Dum”standsforthe4dummies
of Hatton and Williamson (2003) for Ghana and Nigeria for the years 1983 and 1985, “Region-Dum” includes region
dummies, “Time-Dum” time dummies and “Region-Time” time-region dummies. R-squared is not shown, because, in the
case of 2SLS/IV, it is not an appropriate measure of the goodness of ﬁt and has no statistical meaning (see www.stata.com).
49Table 5: IPCC projected changes in rainfall and temperature
projected change in rainfall projected change in temperature
best median worst best median worst
Saharan 57% -6% -44% 2.6 3.6 5.4
West 13% 2% -9% 1.8 3.3 4.7
East 25% 7% -3% 1.8 3.2 4.3
South 6% -4% -12% 1.9 3.4 4.8
Columns “worst”, “median” and “best” correspond to the less optimistic, medium and most optimistic
weather changes of the IPCC’s scenario A1B, i.e. 75%, 50%, and 25% quartile values for projected
changes in precipitation (%) and to the 25%, 50%, and 75% quartile values for projected
changes in temperature (◦C) between the period 1980-1999 and the period 2080-2099.
Source: IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, Scenario A1B (Christensen et al., 2007).
Table 6: Weather-induced migration for the sub-Saharan Africa region
1960-2000 Projections for the end of the 21st century
best median worst
Weather-driven migration
Annual net (international) migration rate(a) -0.30 -1.21 -3.40 -5.32
Annual number of net international migrants(b) -128’414
Annual number of internal migrants(b,c) 4’206’729
Total number of net international migrants -5’136’569
Total number of internal migrants(c) 168’269’153
Proj. ann. nb. of net int’l migr. (low fertility)(d) -2’910’008 -8’493’369 -13’332’808
Proj. ann. nb. of net int’l migr. (medium fertility)(d) -4’053’671 -11’784’960 -18’477’402
Proj. ann. nb. of net int’l migr. (high fertility)(d) -5’528’551 -16’014’948 -25’080’975
Contribution of rainfall and temperature
anomalies to net international migration
Temperature 47 % 162 % 103 % 92 %
Rainfall 53 % -62 % -3 % 8 %
Contribution of amenity and economic geography
channel to net international migration
Amenity channel 101 % 352 % 224 % 200 %
GDP per capita (econ. geog. channel) 120 % 170 % 145 % 140 %
Urban population (econ. geog. channel) -121 % -422 % -269 % -241 %
Table displays net (international) migration rate and the net number of (international) migrants displaced out of SSA
countries due to weather changes over the period 1960-2000 and projections for the end of the 21st century. Negative
numbers for net international migration mean that there were more emigrants than immigrants.
(a) Net migration rate is expressed in 1000 of population.
(b) Calculated using 1960-2000 population averages.
(c) Refers to rural-urban migration, i.e. increases in urbanization.
(d) Proj. ann. nb. of net int’l migr. stands for projected annual number of international migrants. In the cases (i) 1980-99
pop., (ii) low fertility, (iii) medium fertility and (iv) high fertility, projected migrants are obtained by multiplying the
projected net migration rates of the ﬁrst row with the (i) 1980-1999 population averages, (ii) 2080-2099 averages UN low
fertility population projections, (iii) medium fertility projections and (iv) high fertility projections.
50Figure 3: Projected net environmental migrants per thousand of population, 2000-2099
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1 Literature overview on environmentally-induced migration
There has been some controversy on whether migration strongly ﬁgures as a means of adaptation to
environmental factors or not. For example, tentative projections by Myers (1996) suggest that we
might see around 200 million environmental refugees if the sea level rises by one meter. In contrast
to this claim, Black (2001)’s reading of the literature strongly suggests that much of the literature on
environmental refugees until 2001 does not give rise to the conclusion that environmental, climate or
weather conditions are a signiﬁcant contributor towards migration. During the past ten years there have
been substantial further contributions on this topic, belonging to either of the two points of view. Thus,
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1in this overview we constrain ourselves to hard evidence on environmental factors inducing migration
based on either case studies or econometric analysis. An overview is provided in Table 1. Furthermore,
we limit ourselves to evidence based on the last 60 years.
As Table 1 shows, most of the recent evidence supports the view that environmental factors have
contributedtomigration, bothrural-urbanandinternationalmigration. Whilemostoftheenvironmentally-
induced migration in Africa has been linked to droughts, most migration in the US has arisen as a
consequence of hurricanes and for quality of life reasons (also for Europe). Thus, the evidence points
to two channels - one we dub the ‘amenity channel’, which one may link to the amenity value attached
to the environment (quality of life); and we call the other the ‘economic geography channel’, which
can be related to economic geography effects (income and urbanization). Most of the studies do not
clearly separate the two channels, which makes it difﬁcult to attribute empirical results to either one.
Furthermore, most studies do not control for endogeneities affecting income or employment oppor-
tunities which subsequently affect incentives to migrate (exceptions being Munshi (2003), Feng et al.
(2010) and Naude (2008)). Not controlling for these endogeneities may certainly lead to biased results.
There are four articles that point towards evidence suggesting that environmental factors do not
induce migratory movements (Findley (1994), Paul (2005), Halliday (2006), and Mortreux and Bar-
nett (2009)). Findley (1994) studied droughts in Mali and concludes that droughts did not increase
overall migration, but reduced long-term migration and increased short-term migration. This change
in migration pattern should be attributed to the fact that long-term migration is associated with signiﬁ-
cant uncertainty of whether it is possible to ﬁnd work quickly enough in order to support the family at
home. Clearly, during a drought immediate ﬁnance is necessary, which is more easily obtained through
short-distance migration. Supporting this income channel effect is the observation that “[d]uring the
2drought, 63 percent of the families said that they depended on remittances from family members who
had already migrated.” ((Findley, 1994), pp. 544) Thus, this supports our view that neglecting the
effect of environmental factors on income may bias empirical results.
Paul (2005) ﬁnds that the 2004 ﬂooding in Bangladesh did not lead to migration due to disaster aid.
The obvious questions is whether we would have observed migration without this disaster aid or not.
A useful conclusion that one can draw from his works is, however, that though environmental factors
might provide reasons for migration, good governance can work against this.
Finally, Mortreux and Barnett (2009) studied migration incentives in an island of Tuvalu and con-
cludes that climate change does not ﬁgure as an important driver of migration decisions. Religious
beliefs as well as no immediate threat of sea level rise seem to be the main reasons behind this point of
view. This result stands in contrast to the more immediate threat of sea level rise faced by the Carteret
Islands (Papua New Guinea islands). Here, evacuation started in 2009 and will continue throughout
the next years as a response to the sea level rise which is likely to submerge the Carteret Islands.
Insummary, theevidencetendstofavortheresultthattheenvironmenthasanimpactonrural-urban
as well as international migration. However, the literature review emphasizes also that it is important
to distinguish between the amenity channel and the economic geography channel, as well as between
internal and international migration. This task should, ideally, be undertaken in a uniﬁed framework.
32 Additional tables: Variable description and unit root tests
Table 2 offers a detailed description of the main variables with an indication of the various sources
used. Table 3 presents one-period lagged unit root tests for unbalanced panels.
3 The amenity channel
Columns (1)-(3) in Table 4 are estimated by means of a pooled estimation. We use this method as it is
likely to capture the long-term relationship between our explanatory variables and net migration rates
in sub-Saharan Africa, provided standard assumptions are fulﬁlled (see also Hatton and Williamson
(2003)). Regressions (1) and (2) of Table 4 start by introducing the environmental, political and eco-
nomic incentives to migrate, without any reference to our theoretical framework. We also correct our
standard errors for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Using Pooled Ordinary Least Squares
estimation (POLS), models (1) and (2) show that neither rainfall nor temperature seem to affect the
incentives to migrate at the means.1 Moreover, in model (3) we introduce an interaction term between
the weather variables and the ‘agricultural’ dummy (AGRI). At least two reasons motivate the choice
of such an explanatory variable. First, our theoretical model suggests that the effect of weather vari-
ations should be conditional on an exposure term, where a more dominant agricultural sector in the
national economy implies a larger exposure. Second, this interaction term corresponds to the common
sense view that agriculture-dependent countries will be particularly vulnerable to weather variability
(Collier et al., 2008; World Bank, 2010). In regressions (1)-(3), weather variations appear not to affect
net migration ﬂows in neither of the three POLS regressions. The dummies proposed by Hatton and
1For consistency reasons, we also include temperature and rainfall anomalies separately, but the effect of these weather
variables remains insigniﬁcant.
4Williamson (2003) are signiﬁcant and capture the policy-induced expulsion of Ghanaian migrants by
the Nigerian government.
Nevertheless, it is well known that our POLS estimation may suffer from an endogeneity bias due
to unobserved heterogeneity among the countries of our sample. For example, this would be the case
if a long tradition of labor migration (Adepoju, 1995) affects the dependent variable and the GDP per
capita ratio variable but does not follow the regional patterns captured by our regional-time dummies.
A more promising approach is to get rid of the possible presence of a (time-constant) unobserved effect
by using a ﬁxed-effects estimation (FE). Like the POLS estimations, the FE models regressions (4)-(8)
of Table 4 indicate that weather variables do not seem to have an impact on migration, even when
introducing further lags as in regressions (7) and (8).
As pointed in the paper, it would, however, be hasty to conclude from this that weather variations
do not impact migration behavior. For example, weather variables are known to affect GDP per capita
as shown in Barrios et al. (2010) and Dell et al. (2009). Although no amenity effect from weather
variations to migration is identiﬁed, our theoretical framework also suggests that weather variations
may indirectly affect migration through the economic geography channel. Furthermore, our theoret-
ical model also points to a possible endogeneity bias threatening the economic variables. The paper
proposes an approach to consider both the amenity and the economic geography channel of weather
variations on international migration and to deal with the endogeneity of the main economic variables.
54 Robustness tests: Additional tables
Robustness checks are not shown in the paper but are described in this supplementary material and
are based on the baseline results, regressions (3) to (5) from Table 4 in the paper. These robustness
checks relate to the use of alternative dependent variables (Table 5), alternative deﬁnition of the main
explanatory variables of interest (Tables 6-8) and the addition or omission of control variables (Table
9) and the use of alternative bilateral migration data (Table 10).
First, in addition to robustness shown in the paper and based on bilateral migration data, Table 5
shows that our results do not depend on the refugee-related correction done to the net migration rate.
Regressions (9) to (11) replicate the over-identiﬁed estimation of Table 4 in the paper without subtract-
ing the net refugee ﬂows from the migration rate but introducing them as an explanatory variable. Since
now the dependent variable incorporates the movement of refugees, the net refugee ﬂows (NetREF)
exhibit a positive coefﬁcient which is close to 1. Although it unduly increases the risk of endogeneity,
our results are unaltered by this inclusion.
Second, we testthe robustness ofour ﬁndings to an alternative deﬁnition ofour variables ofinterest,
the weather-related variables. Regressions (12) to (14) of Table 6 indicate that similar results are
obtained when rainfall and temperature are expressed in levels rather than in anomaly terms. The same
results are obtained when the levels are transformed into logarithm. In regressions (15) to (20) of Table
6, the inclusion of a foreign-deﬁned version or of lagged values for weather variables does not change
our main results.2 Nevertheless, most of these additional variables are far from being signiﬁcant.
Only temperature seems to have some lagging effects on the GDP per capita ratio and the level of
urbanization. Even if we do not elaborate further on these results, the lagging effect of temperature is
2Note that the inclusion of foreign climatic variables is a particularly strong assumption about the capacity of the
migrants to react to weather variations occurring in foreign countries.
6consistent with evidence provided by Dell et al. (2008). Results are also robust to alternative deﬁnitions
for the GDP per capita. Replacing GDP per capita by the GDP per worker (regressions (21) to (23) of
Table 7), using the Chain transformation instead of the Laspeyres index in the real terms transformation
(regressions (24) to (26) of Table 7) do not change the main results of the paper. We also test the
results of the paper to alternative weighting in the computation of the Foreign wage. These alternative
weights include other proxies than the distance for migration costs, including colonial link (regressions
(27) to (29) of Table 7) a common colonial ruler (regressions (30) to (32) of Table 8) and linguistic
proximity (regressions (36) to (38) of Table 8). 3 We could indeed assume that since African countries
are more likely to have less migration restrictions with their former colonial ruler, the fact to have a
colonial relationship is the distinction that matters for the foreign wage (Mcube et al., 2010). It has
to be noted that it cannot be introduced as a control variable in the migration equation as it is time-
constant. We could also assume that the fact to have experienced a similar colonial experiences is what
matters because it will capture many similarities due to common colonial heritage (Acemoglu et al.,
2001; La Porta et al., 1999; Huillery, 2009). According to Tables 7 and 8, results remain unaltered
when the foreign wage is weighted by these alternative proxies for migration costs. These robustness
checksremain validwhenthecolonialorlinguistic proximity indicators areinteractedwith thedistance
between countries. Regarding the use of distance, we also test the robustness of our results to the
assumption that only neighboring countries matter for migration (regressions (33) to (35) of Table 8).
Our results remain robust to that more restrictive assumption on migration costs.
Third, we also test the robustness of our results to the addition or omission of some control vari-
ables. For example, one may think that the entry into the ACP agreements could also constitute another
3We use the linguistic proximity based on ofﬁcial or national languages and languages spoken by at least 20% of the
population of the country in Table 8. However, similar results are obtained when we use mother tongue as a criteria. These
variables are taken from the CEPII’s distances measures (Mayer and Zignago, 2006).
7determinant of international migration. Completing the data by Head et al. (2010) on the entry into
ACP with data for Botswana and Namibia, adding the entry into ACP as an additional control variable
does not alter the main results and shows a non-signiﬁcant coefﬁcient (with the exception of the effect
on the GDP ratio). This can be seen in regressions (39) to (41) of Table 9. Furthermore, since the
works by Miguel et al. (2004) and Burke et al. (2009), we cannot exclude that weather affects conﬂict
and, hence, the inclusion of the conﬂict variable may wipe out some of the explanatory power of our
weather variables. Therefore, the inclusion of the conﬂict-related variables may undermine our estima-
tions of climate-induced migration. Although introducing a potential omitted variable bias, omitting
the conﬂict-related variable does not alter the main results of this paper (regressions (42) to (44) of Ta-
ble 9). As expected, the direct and indirect effects of weather variations on migration slightly increase
as a result of this omission. Finally, Hatton and Williamson (2003) point out that demographic pressure
is an important determinant of international migration. According to regressions (45) to (47) of Table
9, our main results remain valid when introducing such a demographic variable in our speciﬁcation
with the lagged value of population density, which is signiﬁcant and affects net migration negatively.
However, potential endogeneity issues induced by the introduction of population density require to be
cautious with this speciﬁcation and lead us to exclude this variable from our paper.
Fourth, one last robustness check deserves further attention. In Table 10, we test the robustness
of our results to an alternative dependent variable, based on the OECD database on bilateral migra-
tion ﬂows between our 39 SSA countries and 14 destination countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States). We should note that the research question becomes radically differ-
ent as there are many reasons to believe that migration within Africa greatly differs from migration
8movements outside Africa (see e.g. Mayda, 2010). Given the dyadic nature of these data and similar to
Mayda (2010), our speciﬁcation replaces our country ﬁxed effect by a destination and origin countries’
ﬁxed effects, while the GDP ratio deﬁned as the log of the origin country’s (y) to the destination coun-
try’s GDP per capita (yF). Regression (48) of Table 10 ﬁrst adopts a speciﬁcation similar to Mayda
(2010) but restricted to our sample. Like Mayda (2010), we use as dependent variable the emigration
rate, i.e. immigrant inﬂow from origin to destination country (multiplied by 100’000), divided by ori-
gin country’s population. The data is similar to Mayda (2010), but extended to more countries and
years by Ortega and Peri (2009, 2011)4 As expected by Mayda (2010), a negative coefﬁcient is found
for the GDP per capita ratio (signiﬁcant at 10%). In regression (49) of Table 10, we introduce the
weather-related incentives to migrate and proceed in regressions (50) to (56) to the same two-stage es-
timations than in our baseline results. We conﬁrm our main results of table 4 in the article. Decreased
rainfall anomalies increase the economic incentives to migrate from countries highly dependent on
the agricultural sector, while temperature anomalies in turn increase that economic incentives. And
this is true for migration outside Africa. However, we should acknowledge that the direct effects of
weather anomalies on international migration and the buffer effect of the level of urbanization does
not hold anymore. The impact of weather anomalies on the level of urbanization is conﬁrmed but this
last variable is not signiﬁcant anymore in the second stage. Two explanations may be advanced. First
of all, the fact that weather deviations do not directly affect international migration outside of Africa
seems perfectly consistent with Mayda (2010) view that poverty constraints may be binding for some
forms of international migration outside Africa. Second, the fact that agglomeration economies are
4Ortega and Peri (2009) and Ortega and Peri (2011) build on Mayda (2010) to extend the existing datasets on bilateral
migration ﬂows (gross and net) and stocks to more countries (14 OECD destinations and 74 countries of origin) and years
(1980-2005) 1980-2007. Ortega and Peri’s data offer different migration variables originating from different sources, but
only the one based on UN data is going back until 1960 and is, according to Ortega and Peri, the most suitable for long-term
analysis.
9not sufﬁcient to counter-balance at least partly the climate-related economic incentives to migrate out-
side Africa is consistent with the low levels of agglomeration forces within African cities at a global
scale (de Brauw et al., 2011). Not jeopardizing our main results, this last robustness check certainly
undermines the external validity of our results.
5 Details on the projections
Past movements. The annual average for any variable V over the period 1960-2000 is indicated by
µ1960−2000(V). The average annual migration ﬂow over the period 1960-2000, µ1960−2000(MIGR), due
to variations in rainfall and temperature is computed as follows:
µ
1960−2000(MIGR) = APERAIN µ
1960−2000(RAIN) + APETEMP µ
1960−2000(TEMP),
whereµ1960−2000(RAIN)andµ1960−2000(TEMP)aretheaverageannualrainfallandtemperatureanoma-
lies, respectively, over the period 1960-2000. The average partial effects (APE) of rainfall anomalies
and of temperature anomalies on net migration combine the direct effect and the indirect effects via the
GDP per capita ratio and the level of urbanization of climate variations. We use for this computation
the signiﬁcant coefﬁcients of the most precise results of regressions (3)-(5) of Table 4 in the paper.
This means that we use the signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on TEMP and RAIN*AGRI of regression (3), on
TEMP and TEMP*AGRI of regression (4), and on TEMP, TEMP*AGRI, log(y/yF) and log(URB) of
regression (5).5
5Our preferred speciﬁcation (3)-(5) yields average partial effects (APE) of rainfall and temperature in agriculturally-
dominated countries (Agri=1) and in countries with below median agricultural GDP share (Agri=0) taking on the following
values: APERAIN,Agri=1=1.07, APERAIN,Agri=0=0, APETEMP,Agri=1=-0.65 and APETEMP,Agri=0=0.53. These values account for
the amenity and economic geography channel of weather on migration.
10Future movements. The IPCC projected future changes in climate for the 21st century are based on
different atmosphere-ocean general circulation models and different climate scenarios. The scenarios
are divided into four families (A1, A2, B1, B2), depending on assumptions on the future evolution
of greenhouse gas pollution, land-use, technological development, economic growth, demographic
changes, etc. Our projections of weather-driven migration are based on weather changes given by
family A1 and in particular climate scenario A1B, described in detail in Chapter 11 of the IPCC report
(Christensen et al., 2007). This scenario assumes, among other things, an increasing but moderate
emission trajectory over the 21st century (Global GHG emissions, i.e. CO2, CH4, N2O and F-gases,
increase until 2050 and then slowly decrease until 2100), a more and more integrated world with rapid
economic growth. This scenario choice is not an unreasonable choice for our projections, given that
the world economy is marked by the rapid growth of China and India and that sub-Saharan Africa also
experienced surprisingly high economic growth rates in the 2000s (Easterly, 2009).
The IPCC scenarios account also for future population evolution, assuming that world population
in 2100 attaining 7.1 billion (families A1 and B1), 10.4 billion (family B2) or 15 billion (family A2) in
2100. In comparison, the United Nations’ Population Division (United Nations, 2009) projects world
population to attain either 6.2 (low fertility scenario), 10.1 (medium fertility scenario) or 15.8 (high
fertility scenario). Scenario A1B assumes that world population peaks around 2050 and settles at 7.1
billion in 2100. This assumption thus comprised between the low and medium fertility scenarios of the
UN.
The IPCC provides projections on the change in regional temperature and precipitation between the
periods 1980-1999 and 2080-2099. Table 5 in the paper shows the best, median and worst long term
climate changes in terms of temperature ( ◦C) and precipitation (%) for 4 African regions (Saharan,
11Western, Eastern and Southern Africa). These changes stem from differences between the 1980-1999
period and the 2080-2099 period. To obtain these predictions, the IPCC relies on a multi-model data
set which makes use of information from all available realisations for the 1980 to 1999 period and plots
the evolution of projected changes for a speciﬁc scenario for the period 2080-2099. The best, median
and worst cases - representing the 25%, 50% and 75% quartile values for changes in temperature
( ◦C) and the 75%, 50% and 25% quartile values for changes in precipitation (%) - are reported based
on 21 models (Christensen et al., 2007, p.854). Since climatic predictions by the IPCC are based
on realizations over the period 1980-1999, we computed the impact on net migration of a change
in climatic variables with respect to the average climatic situation over the period 1980-1999. The
predicted net numbers of migrants are calculated based on the average population over the period
1980-1999. Our calculations are described in what follows.
The projected change in net migration ﬂows due to forecasted weather variations, ∆MIGR, can be
computed by adopting the following strategy:
∆MIGR = APERAIN (∆RAIN) + APETEMP (∆TEMP) (1)
where the APE’s are computed as before. A change in any variable V refers to the change between
the annual average value of V over the period 2080-2099 and the annual average over the period 1980-
1999, ∆V = µ2080−2099(V) − µ1980−1999(V). ∆RAIN and ∆TEMP are thus forecasted changes in
weather variable anomaly and are directly based on the IPCC forecasted weather changes. The average
annual rainfall and temperature anomaly over the period 2080-2099, µ2080−2099(RAIN), is given by the
difference in the average rainfall level during period 2080-2099 and the one over the long-run period,






The rainfall level during the period 2080-2099 corresponds to average level during the period 1980-






The future change in temperature anomalies, ∆TEMP, is calculated in an analogous way. We can then
compute the additional net migration ﬂows induced by future weather variations via equation (1) and
by using our preferred estimates in regressions (3)-(5) of Table 4 in the paper for the APE’s and the
IPCC predictions for ∆RAIN
IPCC
level and ∆TEMPIPCC
level (see Table 5 in the paper for the IPCC’s weather
forecasts).
Based on these projections, Table 11 ranks the countries of our sample according to highest ad-
ditional net out-migration expected by future weather change in the median outcome of the IPCC
projections. The numbers of net migrants are computed by using the medium-fertility population sce-
nario of the UN Population Projections (United Nations, 2009). It also offers the variation in yearly
net migration for the worst and best weather changes, and also as a comparison, the yearly average net
migration induced by observed weather variations over the period 1960-2000 for every country in the
sample.
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19Table 1: Literature overview
Study focuses on
Source Country/Place Period Results
EVIDENCE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS ON MIGRATION
Naude (2008) sub-Saharan Africa 1965-2005 natural disasters induces conﬂicts
which lead to out-migration
Barrios et al. (2010) Sub-saharan Africa 1960-1990 lower rainfall induces urbanization
Hammer (2004) Niger 1985 1 million migrated due to droughts
(plus many more in the Sahel region
during 1973 - 1999)
Smith and Petley (2009) Bangladesh 1994 0.4% of households migrated from
ﬂooding
Henry et al. (2003) Burkina Faso 1970-1998 odds of migrating are higher in dry
regions vs. those with average rain-
fall
Dillon et al. (2010) Nigeria 1988-2008 temperature affects incentives to
migrate
Ezra and Kiros (2001) Ethopia 1984-1994 vulnerability to food crisis induces
migration
Dercon (2004) Ethopia 1989-1997 rainfall affects consumption growth
Gutmann and Field (2010) City of New Orleans 2005 four years after Hurricane Katrina
population is still down by 23%
Gutmann and Field (2010) southern South Sade County 1992 Hurricane Andrew led to reduction
in population of 39%
Rappaport and Sachs (2003) USA 2000 quality of life (measured through
weather) effect leads to larger pop-
ulation concentration at coast
Rappaport (2007) USA 1970-2000 population density affected by
quality of life (measured through
weather)
Feng et al. (2010) Mexico 1995-2005 weather-driven changes in crop
yields affect migration rate to the
US
Leighton (2006) North-East Brazil 1960-1980 drought and desertiﬁcation induced
3.4 million migrants




Mexico 1980-2005 natural disasters lead to internal mi-
gration
Munshi (2003) Mexico 1982-1997 rainfall induces Mexico to US mi-
gration
Cheshire and Magrini (2000) Europe 1980-2000 climatic variations impact urban
population growth
EVIDENCE AGAINST ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS ON MIGRATION
Findley (1994) Mali 1982, 1989 droughts did not increase overall
migration, but there was an in-
crease in female and child as well
as shorter-cycle migration
Paul (2005) Bangladesh 2004 no migration (due to disaster aid)
Halliday (2006) El Salvador 2001 earthquake reduced migration
Mortreux and Barnett (2009) Tuvalu 2007 climate change no apparent reason
for migration
20Table 2: Variable deﬁnition and sources
CODE Deﬁnition Characteristics Source
MIGR Net migration ﬂows Difference between numbers of immigrants
and emigrants per thousands of population
from 1960 to 2000, on a yearly basis, cor-
rected by the refugee movement
US Census Bureau and UNHCR (2009)
RAIN Rain Anomalies Deviations from the country’s long-term
mean, divided by its long-run standard de-
viation
Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC)
TEMP Temperature Anomalies Deviations from the country’s long-term
mean, divided by its long-run standard de-
viation
Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC)
y/yF GDPpercapitaoverGDPpercapita
in other African countries weighted
by the distance. To build this ratio,
weexcludedfromthenumeratorthe
country for which there was a miss-
ing value for GDP per capita, and
thus correspondingly also excluded
its distance to country r in the de-
nominator. (This is to keep the
sumofrowsintheweighting matrix
equal to 1, see Anselin (2002)). The
distance function used is f(d) =
1/d2, where d is distance of other
countries to country r
Available 1960-2000 Income per capita from Penn World Ta-
bles and World Bank data and data for d
originates from CEPII (Mayer and Zignago,
2006).
WAR war onset 1 for civil war onset Fearon and Latin (2003)
WARF War onsets in other countries
weighted by distance
Value between 0 and 1; war onsets in another
sub-Saharan African country weighted by a
distance function
Fearon and Latin (2003) and CEPII
URB Urban population Share of urban population in total population United Nations (2009)
AGRI Whether a country has an agricul-
tural value added above the median
in 1995 (similar to Dell, 2009)
Dummy variable World Bank (2009) for agricultural value
added.
∆ Money Money plus Quasi-Money Absolute growth in money supply, available
1960-2000
Robert Bates’ Database (Bates et al., 2011)
New State Independence 1 if country is in the two ﬁrst years of inde-
pendence, available 1960-2000
Fearon and Latin (2003)
POPden Population density People per square meter, available 1960-
2000
Robert Bates’ Database (Bates et al., 2011)
















** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
MIGRa stands for net migration rate without the correction for the refugee movement.
Fisher statistics are given by the test of Maddala and Wu (1999). Unit test with one period lag.
22Table 4: Basic Regressions
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Models POLS POLS POLS FE FE FE FE FE
RAIN -0.232 -0.21 -0.24 -0.223 -0.216 0.0168 -0.255 -0.00701
[0.340] [0.345] [0.312] [0.368] [0.347] [0.301] [0.352] [0.312]
TEMP -0.33 -0.169 -0.00869 -0.216 -0.0631 0.000572 -0.142 -0.053
[0.382] [0.362] [0.257] [0.270] [0.254] [0.295] [0.248] [0.250]
RAIN*AGRI 0.0548 -0.593 -0.639
[0.809] [0.833] [0.835]










log(y/yF) 0.813 0.799 -0.385 -0.336 -0.29 -0.254
[0.703] [0.711] [2.612] [2.597] [2.639] [2.643]
log(URB) 0.78 0.794 -2.668 -2.633 -3.026 -3.011
[0.713] [0.750] [3.711] [3.692] [3.794] [3.782]
WARt−1 1.338 1.366 1.009 1.072 1.034 1.119
[3.490] [3.530] [3.320] [3.320] [3.329] [3.331]
WARF
t−1 -2.749 -2.815 -2.608 -2.68 -2.411 -2.29
[3.997] [4.026] [5.208] [5.169] [5.090] [5.105]
AGRI 0.289
[0.911]
Constant 0.257 -1.327 -1.526 0.197 8.226 8.17 9.344 9.331
[0.446] [2.866] [2.850] [0.250] [10.30] [10.26] [10.67] [10.64]
Observations 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750
R-squared 0.002 0.014 0.015 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007
F-test 0.655 1.38 1.454 1.033 0.564 0.623 0.668 0.841
Number of coun 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Robust standard errors are in square brackets. y stands for GDP per capita.
23Table 5: Robustness to an alternative dependent variable
Regressions (9) (10) (11)
Models FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS
SE Robust Robust Robust
Stage 1st 1st 2nd
Dependent log(y/yF) log(URB) MIGRa
Variable
RAIN -0.0227* -0.00323 0.854
[0.0137] [0.00834] [0.862]
TEMP -0.0437*** -0.0205** 2.934**
[0.0154] [0.00879] [1.302]
RAIN*AGRI 0.0494*** 0.00161 -1.293
[0.0187] [0.00997] [0.994]
TEMP*AGRI 0.00879 0.0457*** -4.386**
[0.0218] [0.00984] [1.814]
WARt − 1 -0.0755 0.00987 3.096
[0.0880] [0.0259] [5.919]
WARF
t−1t − 1 -0.173 0.0224 0.581
[0.149] [0.0840] [7.288]







∆ Money 0.126** 0.0581*
[0.0580] [0.0351]
New State UK -0.642*** 0.230***
[0.0894] [0.0484]
New State -0.0285 -0.0358
[0.0508] [0.0338]
HW-Duma incl. incl. incl.
Region-Duma incl. incl. incl.
Time-Duma incl. incl. incl.
Region-Timea incl. incl. incl.
Observations 750 750 750
Number of countries 39 39 39
F-test 92.76*** 67.94*** 24.86***
F-Test on excluded IV 30.26*** 12.96***
Underid test 7.449**
Weak id stat 2.334
P-value Hansen test 0.862
Endo stat 13.08***
Root MSE 0.23 0.097 11.01
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. MIGRa stands for net migration rate without the correction
for the refugee movement. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. y stands for domestic GDP per capita, yF stands
for foreign GDP per capita. “HW-Dum” stands for the 4 dummies of Hatton and Williamson (2003) for Ghana and Nigeria
for the years 1983 and 1985, “Region-Dum” includes region dummies, “Time-Dum” time dummies and“Region-Time”
time-region dummies.
24Table 6: Robustness to alternative climatic variables
Regression (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Models FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS
SE robust robust robust robust robust robust robust robust robust
Stage 1st 1nd 2st 1st 1nd 2nd 1st 1st 2nd
Dependent log(y/yF) log(URB) MIGR log(y/yF) log(URB) MIGR log(y/yF) log(URB) MIGR
Alternative 1 RAINlevel RAINlevel RAINlevel RAINF RAINF RAINF RAINt−1 RAINt−1 RAINt−1
Alternative 2 TEMPlevel TEMPlevel TEMPlevel TEMPF TEMPF TEMPF TEMPt−1 TEMPt−1 TEMPt−1
Alternative 3 RAINlevel RAINlevel RAINlevel RAINF RAINF RAINF RAINt−1 RAINt−1 RAINt−1
*AGRI *AGRI *AGRI *AGRI *AGRI *AGRI *AGRI *AGRI *AGRI
Alternative 4 TEMPlevel TEMPlevel TEMPlevel TEMPF TEMPF TEMPF TEMPt−1 TEMPt−1 TEMPt−1
*AGRI *AGRI *AGRI *AGRI *AGRI *AGRI *AGRI *AGRI *AGRI
RAIN -0.0255* -0.00431 0.936 -0.0202 -0.00164 0.615
[0.0144] [0.00838] [0.845] [0.0142] [0.00806] [0.883]
TEMP -0.0404** -0.0281*** 3.146** -0.0354** -0.0164* 2.552*
[0.0180] [0.0101] [1.444] [0.0159] [0.00885] [1.350]
RAIN*AGRI 0.0539*** 0.00504 -1.529 0.0448** -0.00285 -0.656
[0.0197] [0.0101] [1.023] [0.0189] [0.00977] [1.023]
TEMP*AGRI -0.00646 0.0606*** -4.566** 0.00572 0.0341*** -4.278**
[0.0304] [0.0140] [2.305] [0.0221] [0.00965] [1.925]
Alternative 1 -2.109** 0.175 37.87 0.106 0.0113 -3.063 -0.0151 0.0054 -0.0861
[0.997] [0.468] [48.63] [0.114] [0.0587] [5.754] [0.0148] [0.00792] [0.911]
Alternative 2 -0.0919** -0.0354 5.888** 0.0438 0.213 -18.84 -0.0345** -0.0174** 2.282
[0.0421] [0.0255] [2.980] [0.279] [0.148] [15.52] [0.0161] [0.00861] [1.468]
Alternative 3 3.068** -0.609 -35.45 -0.125 -0.0696 11.19 0.025 -0.00652 0.221
[1.338] [0.621] [58.57] [0.171] [0.0830] [9.504] [0.0191] [0.00954] [0.997]
Alternative 4 0.0319 0.109*** -11.00** 0.134 -0.153 3.934 0.0129 0.0325*** -2.586
[0.0653] [0.0317] [4.410] [0.229] [0.0983] [10.34] [0.0221] [0.00989] [2.051]
WARt−1 -0.0716 0.0125 2.666 -0.0772 0.00976 2.987 -0.0765 0.0115 2.507
[0.0859] [0.0263] [5.459] [0.0877] [0.0258] [5.498] [0.0877] [0.0260] [5.699]
[0.405] [0.633] [0.625] [0.379] [0.706] [0.587] [0.383] [0.659] [0.660]
WARF
t−1 -0.181 0.0212 0.389 -0.202 0.00136 3.128 -0.175 0.0409 -1.649
[0.153] [0.0817] [6.991] [0.148] [0.0847] [7.405] [0.154] [0.0869] [7.937]
[0.239] [0.796] [0.956] [0.172] [0.987] [0.673] [0.255] [0.638] [0.835]
log(y/yF) 19.22*** 18.43*** 17.27**
[6.617] [6.873] [7.335]
[0.00368] [0.00733] [0.0185]




∆ Money 0.127** 0.0639* 0.132** 0.0644* 0.131** 0.0506
[0.0560] [0.0354] [0.0555] [0.0358] [0.0537] [0.0342]
New State UK -0.701*** 0.233*** -0.672*** 0.212*** -0.703*** 0.140***
[0.0925] [0.0488] [0.0957] [0.0510] [0.109] [0.0540]
New State -0.0395 -0.0393 -0.0235 -0.0367 -0.00312 -0.0279
[0.0499] [0.0335] [0.0499] [0.0341] [0.0553] [0.0340]
HW-Duma incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Region-Duma incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Time-Duma incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Region-Timea incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Observations 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750
Nbr of countries 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
Nbr of countries 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
F-test 39.33*** 104.87*** 42.27*** 89.98*** 62.65*** 26.73*** 88.87*** 65.79*** 22.17***
F-Test on excl. IV 31.51*** 12.23*** 27.76*** 9.06*** 22.42*** 3.46***
Underid test 7.899** 7.103** 3.985
Weak id stat 2.511 2.242 1.3
P-value Hansen test 0.764 0.973 0.933
Endo stat 14.33*** 13.71*** 14.42***
Root MSE 0.23 0.098 10.61 0.23 0.097 10.51 0.23 0.096 11.53
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. y stands
for domestic GDP per capita, yF stands for foreign GDP per capita. “HW-Dum” stands for the 4 dummies of Hatton
and Williamson (2003) for Ghana and Nigeria for the years 1983 and 1985, “Region-Dum” includes region dummies,
“Time-Dum” time dummies and“Region-Time” time-region dummies. 25Table 7: Robustness to alternative economic variables (Part 1)
Regression (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29)
Models FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS
SE robust robust robust robust robust robust robust robust robust
Stage 1st 1nd 2st 1st 1nd 2nd 1st 1st 2nd
Dependent log(y/yF) log(URB) MIGR log(y/yF) log(URB) MIGR log(y/yF) log(URB) MIGR
Alternative GDP per GDP per GDP per Chain Chain Chain Colony Colony Colony
log(y/yF) worker worker worker Trans. Trans. Trans.
RAIN -0.0203 -0.00332 0.944 -0.0229 -0.00332 0.846 -0.0197 -0.00332 0.899
[0.0135] [0.00832] [0.894] [0.0139] [0.00832] [0.834] [0.0137] [0.00832] [0.957]
TEMP -0.0416*** -0.0204** 3.095** -0.0429*** -0.0204** 2.846** -0.0384** -0.0204** 3.221**
[0.0149] [0.00876] [1.362] [0.0153] [0.00876] [1.242] [0.0149] [0.00876] [1.511]
RAIN*AGRI 0.0421** 0.00162 -1.437 0.0493*** 0.00162 -1.264 0.0448** 0.00162 -1.33
[0.0183] [0.00997] [1.027] [0.0187] [0.00997] [0.939] [0.0186] [0.00997] [1.095]
TEMP*AGRI 0.0177 0.0455*** -4.496** 0.00808 0.0455*** -4.262** -0.00491 0.0455*** -4.782**
[0.0212] [0.00980] [1.841] [0.0218] [0.00980] [1.697] [0.0216] [0.00980] [2.062]
WARt − 1 -0.0669 0.0104 3.413 -0.0746 0.0104 3.026 -0.0748 0.0104 3.055
[0.0868] [0.0259] [6.238] [0.0877] [0.0259] [5.723] [0.0882] [0.0259] [6.091]
WARF
t−1t − 1 -0.137 0.02 1.054 -0.183 0.02 0.904 -0.205 0.02 1.611
[0.142] [0.0850] [7.670] [0.150] [0.0850] [7.213] [0.147] [0.0850] [8.448]
Alternative 29.66*** 21.75*** 24.60**
log(y/yF) [10.29] [7.269] [9.575]
log(URB) 65.19*** 67.69*** 85.80**
[24.59] [24.17] [34.82]
Instruments
∆ Money 0.0987* 0.0596* 0.129** 0.0596* 0.0618 0.0596*
[0.0519] [0.0350] [0.0563] [0.0350] [0.0541] [0.0350]
New State UK -0.428*** 0.230*** -0.641*** 0.230*** -0.616*** 0.230***
[0.0820] [0.0484] [0.0891] [0.0484] [0.0872] [0.0484]
New State -0.0451 -0.0362 -0.0258 -0.0362 -0.101** -0.0362
[0.0554] [0.0338] [0.0505] [0.0338] [0.0480] [0.0338]
HW-Duma incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Region-Duma incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Time-Duma incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Region-Timea incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Observations 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750
Number of countries 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
F-test 95.46*** 65.79*** 270.96*** 90.41*** 65.79*** 22.20*** 32.49*** 65.79*** 13.71***
F-Test on excl. IV 23.31*** 12.99*** 30.59*** 12.99*** 35.13*** 12.99***
Underid test 11.82*** 7.665** 8.265**
Weak id stat 0.00271 0.0217 0.016
P-value Hansen test 0.746 0.891 0.487
Endo stat 14.67*** 14.56*** 13.08***
Root MSE 0.23 0.097 11.75 0.23 0.097 10.85 0.23 0.097 12.1
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. y stands
for domestic GDP per capita, yF stands for foreign GDP per capita. “HW-Dum” stands for the 4 dummies of Hatton
and Williamson (2003) for Ghana and Nigeria for the years 1983 and 1985, “Region-Dum” includes region dummies,
“Time-Dum” time dummies and“Region-Time” time-region dummies.
26Table 8: Robustness to alternative economic variables (Part 2)
Regression (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38)
Models FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS
SE robust robust robust robust robust robust robust robust robust
Stage 1st 1nd 2st 1st 1nd 2nd 1st 1st 2nd
Dependent log(y/yF) log(URB) MIGR log(y/yF) log(URB) MIGR log(y/yF) log(URB) MIGRa
Alternative log(y/yF) Common Common Common Contiguity Contiguity Contiguity Linguistic Linguistic Linguistic
Colony Colony Colony proximity proximity proximity
RAIN -0.0454*** -0.00332 1.512 -0.0292* -0.00332 0.943 -0.0172 -0.00332 0.748
[0.0151] [0.00832] [1.112] [0.0173] [0.00832] [0.924] [0.0152] [0.00832] [0.896]
TEMP -0.0470*** -0.0204** 3.376** -0.019 -0.0204** 2.471** -0.0381** -0.0204** 2.965**
[0.0172] [0.00876] [1.610] [0.0231] [0.00876] [1.249] [0.0173] [0.00876] [1.408]
RAIN*AGRI 0.0575*** 0.00162 -1.624 0.0497** 0.00162 -1.166 0.0446** 0.00162 -1.133
[0.0192] [0.00997] [1.161] [0.0227] [0.00997] [1.027] [0.0198] [0.00997] [1.017]
TEMP*AGRI -0.0096 0.0455*** -4.568** -0.0314 0.0455*** -3.910** -0.0125 0.0455*** -4.429**
[0.0219] [0.00980] [2.015] [0.0273] [0.00980] [1.734] [0.0232] [0.00980] [1.919]
WARt − 1 -0.0225 0.0104 1.788 -0.0802 0.0104 2.853 -0.104 0.0104 3.408
[0.0887] [0.0259] [6.147] [0.0961] [0.0259] [5.714] [0.0925] [0.0259] [5.813]
WARF
t−1t − 1 -0.145 0.02 0.152 -0.23 0.02 1.192 -0.221 0.02 1.231
[0.163] [0.0850] [9.419] [0.196] [0.0850] [7.884] [0.154] [0.0850] [7.917]
Alternative 24.35** 19.30*** 20.61**
log(y/yF) [9.572] [7.225] [8.007]
log(URB) 83.56** 77.16** 80.91**
[34.38] [30.38] [32.96]
Instruments
∆ Money 0.0685 0.0596* 0.116** 0.0596* 0.0974* 0.0596*
[0.0520] [0.0350] [0.0579] [0.0350] [0.0527] [0.0350]
New State UK -0.608*** 0.230*** -0.827*** 0.230*** -0.804*** 0.230***
[0.0906] [0.0484] [0.0901] [0.0484] [0.0906] [0.0484]
New State -0.101** -0.0362 -0.0204 -0.0362 -0.0248 -0.0362
[0.0488] [0.0338] [0.0572] [0.0338] [0.0487] [0.0338]
HW-Duma incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Region-Duma incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Time-Duma incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Region-Timea incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Observations 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750
Number of countries 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
F-test 285.58*** 65.79*** 50.79*** 28.66*** 65.79*** 19.31*** 65.24*** 65.79*** 25.55***
F-Test on excl. IV 31.88*** 12.99*** 55.21*** 12.99*** 41.87*** 12.99***
Underid test 8.455** 7.548** 6.933**
Weak id stat 0.0146 0.023 0.0312
P-value Hansen test 0.5 0.857 0.803
Endo stat 13.001*** 14.34*** 14.4***
Root MSE 0.239 0.097 12.48 0.27 0.097 11.36 0.241 0.097 11.48
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. y stands
for domestic GDP per capita, yF stands for foreign GDP per capita. “HW-Dum” stands for the 4 dummies of Hatton
and Williamson (2003) for Ghana and Nigeria for the years 1983 and 1985, “Region-Dum” includes region dummies,
“Time-Dum” time dummies and“Region-Time” time-region dummies.
27Table 9: Robustness to the addition or omission of control variables
Regression (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47)
Models FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS
SE robust robust robust robust robust robust robust robust robust
Stage 1st 2nd 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 1st 1st 2nd
Dependent log(y/yF) log(URB) MIGR log(y/yF) log(URB) MIGR log(y/yF) log(URB) MIGR
Variable
Addition ACP ACP ACP Density Density Density
Omission No Conﬂict No Conﬂict No Conﬂict
RAIN -0.0232* -0.0033 0.882 -0.0229 -0.00332 0.849 -0.00819 -0.00133 0.484
[0.0137] [0.00831] [0.822] [0.0141] [0.00831] [0.844] [0.0143] [0.00797] [0.828]
TEMP -0.0426*** -0.0204** 2.851** -0.0435*** -0.0203** 2.858** -0.0387** -0.0200** 2.636**
[0.0152] [0.00877] [1.228] [0.0153] [0.00876] [1.244] [0.0155] [0.00875] [1.221]
RAIN*AGRI 0.0498*** 0.00159 -1.367 0.0473** 0.00191 -1.187 0.0378** -0.000235 -1.271
[0.0185] [0.00996] [0.927] [0.0184] [0.00999] [0.908] [0.0188] [0.0101] [0.980]
TEMP*AGRI 0.0106 0.0452*** -4.161** 0.00614 0.0458*** -4.219** 0.0134 0.0480*** -4.118**
[0.0214] [0.00983] [1.652] [0.0217] [0.00975] [1.696] [0.0219] [0.0101] [1.660]
WARt − 1 -0.0742 0.0104 3.211 -0.0947 0.0039 5.013
[0.0877] [0.0259] [5.818] [0.0904] [0.0251] [6.421]
WARF
t−1t − 1 -0.182 0.02 1.355 -0.26 0.00357 6.48
[0.150] [0.0851] [7.177] [0.164] [0.0829] [7.486]
Addition 0.177* -0.0163 -3.697 0.00310*** 0.000668 -0.140**
[0.1000] [0.0354] [2.936] [0.000754] [0.000590] [0.0606]
log(y/yF) 23.86*** 21.63*** 31.00***
[8.079] [7.243] [10.05]
log(URB) 63.82*** 68.50*** 55.82***
[22.78] [24.37] [19.37]
Instruments
∆ Money 0.128** 0.0598* 0.129** 0.0598* 0.119** 0.0567
[0.0541] [0.0350] [0.0557] [0.0350] [0.0533] [0.0358]
New State UK -0.615*** 0.228*** -0.646*** 0.231*** -0.408*** 0.275***
[0.0929] [0.0489] [0.0897] [0.0481] [0.0975] [0.0613]
New State 0.0843 -0.0467 -0.0292 -0.0362 -0.0469 -0.0395
[0.0892] [0.0380] [0.0508] [0.0337] [0.0514] [0.0342]
HW-Duma incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Region-Duma incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Time-Duma incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Region-Timea incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Observations 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 735 735
Number of countries 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
Number of countries 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
F-test 85.57*** 68.72*** 56.11*** 64.18*** 64.98*** 595.00*** 61.10 54.18*** 3512.28***
F-Test on excl. IV 17.56*** 9.22*** 31.07*** 13.18*** 14.25*** 9.06***
Underid test 7.773** 7.661** 13.59***
Weak id stat 2.56 2.449 4.822
P-value Hansen test 0.535 0.869 0.731
Endo stat 13.94*** 14.41*** 14.45***
Root MSE 0.23 0.097 10.87 0.23 0.097 10.89 0.23 0.098 11.3
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. y stands
for domestic GDP per capita, yF stands for foreign GDP per capita. “HW-Dum” stands for the 4 dummies of Hatton
and Williamson (2003) for Ghana and Nigeria for the years 1983 and 1985, “Region-Dum” includes region dummies,
“Time-Dum” time dummies and“Region-Time” time-region dummies.
28Table 10: Robustness with alternative OECD dataset
Regression (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56)
Models FE FE FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS FE2SLS
SE robust robust robust robust robust robust robust robust robust
Stage 1st 2nd 1st 2st 1nd 1st 2st
Dependent MIGR MIGR log(y/yF) MIGR log(y/yF) MIGR log(y/yF) log(URB) MIGR
Variable
log(y/yF) -2.863** -2.824** -19.73* -12.67* -10.06**
[1.354] [1.357] [10.88] [7.540] [5.022]
RAIN 0.00869 -0.0247*** -0.463 -0.0232*** -0.00424 -0.0232*** -0.00683** 0.0459
[0.239] [0.00570] [0.410] [0.00576] [0.281] [0.00577] [0.00316] [0.232]
RAIN*AGRI -0.155 0.0205*** 0.377 0.0173** -0.0885 0.0186** 0.00509 -0.126
[0.236] [0.00739] [0.404] [0.00738] [0.241] [0.00740] [0.00421] [0.198]
TEMP 0.349 -0.0394*** -0.286 -0.0349*** -0.0717 -0.0336*** -0.0133*** -0.00111
[0.292] [0.00584] [0.559] [0.00603] [0.388] [0.00602] [0.00336] [0.347]
TEMP*AGRI -0.383 -0.00396 -0.426 -0.00637 -0.386 -0.00823 0.0236*** -0.333
[0.345] [0.00772] [0.396] [0.00772] [0.333] [0.00771] [0.00406] [0.323]
log(Distance) -2.143 -2.143 -0.00791 -2.568
[2.368] [2.365] [0.0445] [2.580]
WARt−1 0.631 0.653 0.00466 0.886 -0.00294 0.511 -0.00229 0.00715 0.529




∆ Money 0.0277*** 0.0296*** 0.159*** 0.0612***
[0.00906] [0.0110] [0.0283] [0.0137]




αi Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
αj Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
αij Incl. Incl.
HW-Duma Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Region-Duma Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Time-Duma Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Region-Timea Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Observations 4’959 4’959 4’503 4’503 4’463 4’463 4’463 4’463 4’463
F test 9172*** 37774*** 599*** 3.90*** 593*** 228*** 151***
F-Test on excl. IV 9.33*** 7.31*** 13.85*** 39.27***
P-value Hansen 0.0989
Underid test 14.75*** 11.49*** 26.32***
Root MSE 7.621 7.622 0.210 8.293 0.203 5.834 0.203 0.0911 5.742
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. y stands
for GDP per capita in migrants’ origin countries, yF stands for GDP per capita in destination countries. “HW-Dum”
stands for the 4 dummies of Hatton and Williamson (2003) for Ghana and Nigeria for the years 1983 and 1985, “Region-
Dum” includes region dummies, “Time-Dum” time dummies and “Region-Time” time-region dummies. Efﬁciency of
regressions (16)-(18) have been strengthened by introducing the square of the money supply to make the instruments
stronger. Otherwise, the second-stage is less precise due to the instrument weakness in such a setting. Angrist-Pischke
multivariate F test of excluded instruments for regression (54)-(56). R-squared not shown, because, in the case of 2SLS/IV,
it is not an appropriate measure of the goodness of ﬁt and has no statistical meaning (see www.stata.com).
29Table 11: Projected changes in net migration, by country
A. Annual net migrants (numbers) B. Annual net migrants (per thousand of population)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2080-2099 1960-2000 2080-2099 1960-2000
Country median best worst Country median best worst
Nigeria -4046790 -1352539 -6614062 -22000 Congo Brazz. -9.25 -3.52 -14.69 -0.01
Tanzania -2255926 -781905 -3318285 -13119 Gabon -8.64 -3.53 -13.49 0.23
Kenya -1288887 -513725 -1856386 -14732 Mozambique -8.63 -4.12 -12.72 -0.67
Uganda -830091 -216471 -1262958 -7688 Tanzania -8.60 -2.98 -12.65 -0.55
Niger -642116 -156446 -1138538 -4788 Angola -8.23 -3.97 -12.10 -0.84
Mozambique -640826 -306091 -944822 -10330 Sierra Leone -7.97 -3.21 -12.48 -1.34
Angola -489114 -236036 -719281 -9761 Kenya -7.66 -3.05 -11.03 -0.55
Ghana -427738 -162675 -679480 -9079 Guinea -7.50 -3.01 -11.76 -1.44
Mali -350832 -10878 -664631 -12698 Ghana -6.84 -2.60 -10.87 -0.71
Guinea -268202 -107505 -420574 -9487 Djibouti -6.51 -3.01 -9.13 -0.82
Benin -167796 -58263 -272076 -3786 Nigeria -6.35 -2.12 -10.39 -0.28
Sierra Leone -135132 -54472 -211598 -5971 Uganda -5.93 -1.55 -9.02 -0.55
Congo Brazz. -128248 -48850 -203652 -32 Niger -5.83 -1.42 -10.34 -0.66
Gabon -34191 -13955 -53367 201 Guinea-Bissau -5.47 -2.32 -8.44 -1.34
Guinea-Bissau -28727 -12205 -44360 -1446 Benin -5.43 -1.88 -8.80 -0.84
Gambia -27136 -12568 -40871 -1508 Mali -5.27 -0.16 -9.97 -1.56
Djibouti -12569 -5806 -17635 -443 Gambia -4.86 -2.25 -7.32 -1.63
Botswana -10640 -3282 -14824 -1548 Botswana -4.66 -1.44 -6.49 -1.23
Swaziland 6065 3389 8563 359 Lesotho 3.67 2.05 5.19 0.48
Mauritius 9378 5241 13240 65 Swaziland 3.89 2.18 5.50 0.53
Lesotho 11086 6195 15651 830 Mauritania 4.02 2.90 6.03 0.46
Namibia 21194 11844 29921 1072 Sudan 4.16 3.01 6.24 0.59
Mauritania 42948 31018 64423 1021 Senegal 4.18 2.28 5.96 0.57
Togo 64297 35071 91575 1160 Burkina Faso 4.31 2.35 6.14 0.24
Centr. Afr. Rep. 74061 40397 105480 688 Zimbabwe 4.60 2.57 6.49 0.48
Burundi 84430 47492 113453 2790 Togo 4.79 2.61 6.83 0.31
Liberia 98117 53518 139743 361 Chad 5.18 3.74 7.78 0.11
Zimbabwe 99245 55460 140111 4620 Namibia 5.24 2.93 7.40 0.69
Senegal 193226 105396 275201 4123 Zambia 5.34 2.98 7.54 0.49
Chad 190440 137540 285661 549 Rwanda 5.47 3.07 7.35 0.62
Rwanda 212874 119742 286050 3858 Burundi 5.64 3.17 7.58 0.56
Cameroon 326530 178107 465057 171 Ethiopia 5.84 3.28 7.84 0.30
Côte d’Ivoire 327375 178568 466261 1081 Malawi 6.16 3.44 8.70 0.44
Burkina Faso 336579 183589 479371 2029 Liberia 6.36 3.47 9.05 0.16
Sudan 469210 338874 703815 14567 Côte d’Ivoire 6.62 3.61 9.43 0.10
Zambia 592775 331257 836859 3639 Cameroon 6.90 3.77 9.83 0.02
Malawi 677564 378639 956561 3759 Centr. Afr. Rep. 7.11 3.88 10.12 0.24
Congo Ksh. 1316591 740582 1769168 5241 Congo Ksh. 7.14 4.01 9.59 0.16
Ethiopia 1544354 868699 2075226 14636 Mauritius 7.99 4.46 11.27 0.07
The countries of our sample are ranked according to highest additional net out-migration expected by the IPCC’s scenario A1B median weather forecast.
Columns (1) to (3) display future changes in the number of net migrants as a consequence of IPCC’s scenario A1B projected weather variations. They
account for population increase between 1980-1999 and 2080-2099 as estimated by the medium-fertility scenario of the UN population forecasts.
Columns (5) to (7) show projections for net migration rates induced by weather changes. Column (4) displays the yearly average number of net migrants
induced by weather variations over the period 1960-2000. Column (8) shows the yearly average net migration rate due to weather variations over the
same period. Columns (1) to (3) evaluate the additional number of net migrants compared to the average population for the period 1980-1999.
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